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REIMAGINING STATE BANKING REGULATORS: 
HOW THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
CAN SERVE AS A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW 
REGULATORY FEDERALISM  
By Seth Frotman1 
ABSTRACT  
INTRODUCTION  
I. THE STUDENT DEBT CRISIS AS CONSUMER PROTECTION CRISIS  
II. ENTER THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, WHITHER THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU  
III. STATES MUST ACT  
IV. THE STATE CONSUMER BUREAU: A VISION FOR A FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
SYSTEM THAT CENTERS CONSUMERS 
A. All state consumer financial protection laws should be consolidated 
at a single agency.  
B. Regulators need access to a full toolbox to fix a broken consumer 
finance market.  
C. Agencies’ jurisdiction should be broad enough to cover the entirety of 
the consumer financial services marketplace, without artificial limits based 
on what a product is called or whether a financial institution takes 
deposits.  
D. Consumer complaints are a critical component of consumer-driven 
reform.  




                                                                                                     
1 Seth Frotman is Executive Director of the Student Borrower Protection Center. Until August 2018, he 
served as Student Loan Ombudsman and Assistant Director of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau — the top federal consumer financial regulator for the $1.6 trillion student loan market. The 
following article is an adaptation of testimony delivered by Frotman to the California General Assembly 
in 2019. The author would like to thank Michael Pierce, Benjamin Levi Kaufman, and Bonnie Latreille.  
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ABSTRACT 
With hundreds of millions of Americans owing more than $14 trillion in 
combined household debt, a robust consumer financial protection framework is 
necessary to protect consumers when accessing critical credit markets. America 
relies on a complimentary system of regulatory federalism to uphold these 
protections, premised on robust state oversight and enforcement. However, the 
current implementation of this system is failing to meet the needs of this moment. 
Since the Great Recession, federal policymakers and regulators have devoted 
significant energy and resources to strengthen the oversight and accountability 
mechanisms of the consumer finance market—but these efforts have largely 
overlooked the need for comprehensive reform at the state level.     
This article analyzes the nation’s consumer financial protection framework 
through the lens of the student debt crisis. After the last financial crisis, policymakers 
and regulators promised the American people, “never again.” And yet, tens of 
millions of consumers teeter on the edge of a $1.6 trillion student debt cliff. The 
nation’s response to the student debt crisis provides key insights into both the 
shortfalls and opportunities for progressive consumer protections at every level of 
government.  
Drawing on the lessons learned from the systemic failures that necessitated the 
creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, along with the Bureau’s 
subsequent successes, this article defines the principles upon which states can 
revolutionize consumer protections across all consumer finance markets through the 
creation of state consumer bureaus—thereby completing the unfinished work of 
financial reform.  
INTRODUCTION 
On January 1, 2020, Maine became the tenth state in the country to license and 
oversee student loan servicers–the private-sector financial companies at the heart of 
the $1.6 trillion student loan market.2  With this change in law, Maine lawmakers 
gave state regulators their first real insight into whether some of the nation’s largest 
financial services firms were abiding by basic protections guaranteed under state and 
federal consumer laws. 
                                                                                                     
2 The bill was first introduced in May 2017 and vetoed. L.D. 1507 (128th Leg. 2017); Gov. LePage 
Vetoes Vitelli Bill to Curtail Predatory Lending Practices, ME. SENATE DEMOCRATS, 
http://www.mainesenate.org/gov-lepage-vetoes-vitelli-bill-to-curtail-predatory-lending-practices/ 
[https://perma.cc/P63X-J7HW](last visited Mar. 3, 2020).  It was then reintroduced in March 2019, 
Vitelli Introduces Student Loan Bill of Rights to Prevent Predatory Lending Practices in Maine, MAINE 
SENATE DEMOCRATS, http://www.mainesenate.org/vitelli-introduces-student-loan-bill-of-rights-to-
prevent-predatory-lending-practices-in-maine/ [https://perma.cc/SL4P-RKN3] (last visited Mar. 3, 
2020), and ultimately passed. Governor Mills Signs Student Loan Bill of Rights into Law, ST. ME OFF. 
GOVERNOR JANET T. MILLS, https://www.maine.gov/governor/mills/news/governor-mills-signs-student-
loan-bill-rights-law-2019-06-20 (last visited Mar. 3, 2020); see also Hinshaw Releases Third Edition of 
“Student Loan Servicing Regulations: 50 State Guide on Laws and Legislation”, HINSHAW, 
https://www.hinshawlaw.com/newsroom-news-third-edition-50-state-guide-student-loan-
regulations.html [https://perma.cc/2R7N-X5KN] (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).   
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This legislation and the protections it guarantees were a long time in the making. 
From the start of 2017, the year that the first iteration of this legislation was 
introduced, to the start of 2020 when it was enacted, Mainers incurred an additional 
$638 million in student loan debt.3  Over the intervening 32 months, nearly 200,000 
Mainers were forced to repay their loans in a market replete with predatory actors 
and bad practices.4  This slow march to providing critical consumer protections was 
not unique to Maine. 
In New York, it took two and a half years from the introduction of the state’s 
first student loan oversight bill until its enactment in October 2019.5  In New Jersey, 
the legislative fight took four years.6  In Colorado, it took twenty-eight months.7 
Across each of these states, tens of thousands of borrowers took on billions of dollars 
in new student debt even as they were forced to wait on the protections they 
deserved.8  In fact, since the start of 2015 when Connecticut became the first state to 
pass legislation modernizing state law and empowering state regulators to oversee 
and supervise the student loan servicing industry,9 the national student loan market 
added: 
 $371.3 billion in outstanding student loan debt, a 29% increase;10 
                                                                                                     
3 Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., State Level Household Debt Statistics 2003-2019, N.Y. FED. CONSUMER 
CREDIT PANEL/EQUIFAX (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/xls/area_report_by_year.xls
x [https://perma.cc/3EEF-GPN8]. 
4 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Federal Student Loan Portfolio by Borrower Location, STUDENTAID.GOV (Dec. 
31, 2019), https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/Portfolio-by-Location.xls 
[https://perma.cc/SJ72-QT95]. Fourteen percent of Maine student loan borrowers are now delinquent or 
in default on their loans.  See Consumer Credit Explorer, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA., 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/eqfx/webstat/index [https://perma.cc/B649-BP72] (last visited Apr. 26, 
2020).  
5 The first servicing bill in the New York legislature was introduced on May 3, 2017. NY A07582, BILL 
TRACK 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/BillDetail/875040 [https://perma.cc/F584-TEVZ] (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2020). The bill became effective on  
on October 9 2019. S01958 Summary, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY, 
https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?bn=S01958&term=2019 [https://perma.cc/3Y2T-2KPX] (last visited Apr. 
26, 2020); see also Kirsten Keefe, New York’s Student Loan Servicing Act of 2019, EMPIRE JUST. CTR., 
https://empirejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Policy-Matters-Article-Student-Loan-Servicing-
Act-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEE5-LHK6] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 
6 The first servicing bill was introduced in the New Jersey legislature on November 16, 2015. Assembly 
No. 4707, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2015). The law became effective November 27, 2019. Senate No. 455, 218th 
Leg. (N.J. 2018). 
7 The first servicing bill was introduced in the Colorado legislature on April 21, 2017. HB17-1352 
Regulate Student Education Loan Servicers, COLO. GEN. ASSEMB., (Co. 2017). The bill was signed into 
law in May 2019, and became effective in August 2019. S.B. 19-002, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Co. 2019). 
[https://perma.cc/4JDH-Q87X]. 
8 Author’s analysis of historic state-by-state data produced by the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Office of Federal Student Aid (on file with author). For the most recent state-by-state snapshot of 
outstanding student debt, see U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 4; Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., supra note 3. 
9 H.B. 6915, Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015).  
10 Consumer Credit – G.19, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/ [https://perma.cc/9LPY-3WVW] (last visited Mar. 
5, 2020). 
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 1.8 million more borrowers overall, a 4% increase;11  
 More than $7000 in debt per borrower, on average, a 24% increase;12 and   
 Over two million more borrowers in default on a federal student loan.13  
And yet, only a fraction of the states in our nation have taken the necessary steps 
to police abuses by the companies that handle loans for tens of millions of Americans 
in communities across the country.14  As of April 2020, almost thirty-three million 
student loan borrowers continue to live in a state that lacks effective oversight over 
the key players in the second largest consumer debt market in this country.15  
The student debt crisis is the nation’s first real test of whether we have learned 
the necessary lessons of the Great Recession.16  Too often, and in too many ways, 
we are failing this test.  From breakdowns in student loan servicing that mirror the 
worst abuses of the mortgage crises,17 to subprime student lenders making loans 
designed to fail,18 to student loan debt collectors who abuse the court system to 
compel payments from the most vulnerable borrowers,19 it often appears as if we are 
                                                                                                     
11 Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, STUDENTAID.GOV, 
https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/PortfolioSummary.xls 
[https://perma.cc/7XB3-FRZQ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).  
12 Average balances are calculated based on information on the number of borrowers and the total 
outstanding balance of student debt from the New York Fed's snapshot. 2018 Student Loan Update, 
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/xls/sl_update_2018.xlsx 
[https://perma.cc/ZD9K-YWPP] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).  
13 Nat’l Student Loan Data Sys., Direct Loan Portfolio by Loan Status, STUDENTAID.GOV, 
https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/PortfoliobyLoanStatus.xls 
[https://perma.cc/UMU6-QUQF] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 
14 See Student Loan Servicing Act, ch. 824, No. 2251, 2016 Cal. Stat. 90; An Act Concerning A Student 
Loan Bill of Rights, Pub. Act No. 15-162, 2015 Conn. Acts 656 Reg. Sess.;  Regulate Student Education 
Loan Servicers, SB19-002, 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws; Student Loan Ombudsman Establishment and 
Servicing Regulation Amendment Act, 21-571, Vol. 65 D.C. Reg. 32 (Dec. 7, 2016); An Act 
Concerning Education, Pub. Act 0540, 2017 Ill. Laws 10; An Act to Establish a Student Loan Bill of 
Rights to License and Regulate Student Loan Servicers, L.D. 995, 2019 Me. Laws 431; An Act 
establishing the Office of the Student Loan Ombudsman, No. 4707, 2019 N.J. Laws 200;  S01958, 2019 
N.Y. Laws 1958; Student Loan Bill of Rights Act, H.B. 5936, 2019 R.I. Pub. Laws 33; An Act Relating 
to Establishing a Student Loan Bill of Rights, S.B. 6029, 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws. Washington S.B. 
6029, 65th Leg, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). 
15 See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 4 (calculated as the total number of federal student loan 
borrowers minus those who live in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, California, Illinois, 
Washington, Rhode Island, Colorado, New York, New Jersey, Maine and Virginia). 
16 See generally Seth Frotman, Broken Promises: How Debt-financed Higher Education Rewrote 
America’s Social Contract and Fueled a Quiet Crisis, 4 UT. L. REV. 811 (2018) [hereinafter Broken 
Promises]. 
17 See e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, A Student Loan System Stacked Against the Borrower, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/business/a-student-loan-system-stacked-against-
the-borrower.html [https://perma.cc/T6QR-3AGM]. 
18 See e.g., Chris Arnold, Student Loans a Lot Like the Subprime Mortgage Debacle Watchdog Says, 
NPR (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/09/785527874/student-loans-a-lot-like-the-subprime-
mortgage-debacle-watchdog-says [https://perma.cc/TS8M-EJVN]. 
19 See, e.g., Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, As Paperwork Goes Missing, Private Student 
Loan Debts May Be Wiped Away, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2017) 
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destined to repeat the same mistakes that left millions of homeowners in financial 
ruin barely more than decade ago. The only thing that has changed is the type of debt 
and the date on the calendar. 
But the shortcomings run deeper than the prevalence of bad practices by a 
handful of predatory companies.  The student debt crisis forces us to reassess the 
effectiveness of the entire regulatory infrastructure and the institutions that purport 
to protect the financial futures of hundreds of millions of our fellow citizens.  This 
moment demands a probing analysis of the effectiveness, robustness, and nimbleness 
of our financial regulatory system.  And it calls upon us to answer a simple question: 
will we continue to allow a rapacious financial services industry to outmatch the 
government effort intended to constrain it? Unfortunately, in many ways the answer 
is yes.  
The student debt crisis, and the response to it, have opened new cracks in the 
veneer of our regulatory system.  Those cracks have revealed the anachronistic nature 
of many state laws and state regulators, exposing weaknesses in the oversight they 
attempt to provide over the consumer financial sector at large.  As this Article 
discusses in detail, the escalating student debt crisis offers a case study in the 
lumbering response by lawmakers and regulators—a pattern that is all too common 
in statehouses across the nation.  
State lawmakers have created a regulatory system and passed a patchwork of 
state laws–in pieces, over time–by layering on new functions and authorities in the 
aftermath of each increasingly acute financial crisis.20   
This process is cumbersome and legislative action frequently is too late to head 
off the problems lawmakers seek to solve.  Further, these tools and authorities are 
often enacted in a manner that makes them operate rigidly and in isolation from each 
other, restraining regulators who may wish to act as new financial products are 
developed and new risks emerge. Taken together, it is clear that we have created a 
system that is easy to game and fails to deliver protections for consumers at the scale 
that meets the size of the challenges we face. 
This is devastating not only for the citizens in the individual states in which these 
regulators operate, but for our system of regulatory federalism–a system that depends 
on state regulators to serve as the first line of defense against threats to our broader 
financial system and the American economy at large.21  In short, if states are not up 
                                                                                                     
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/business/dealbook/student-loan-debt-collection.html 
[https://perma.cc/5UUS-ZLZ8]; Natalie Kitroeff, The Lawsuit Machine Going After Student Debtors, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 3, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-
04/the-student-debt-collection-mess [https://perma.cc/EP47-X8DP]. 
20 See, e.g., THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, REENGINEERING NONBANK SUPERVISION 
16 (2019), https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/chapter_two_-
_overview_of_state_nonbank_supervision_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ME3K-V2TY] (“[J]urisdictional 
coverage (who the states have authority over) can be complicated and not all states have the same 
jurisdiction.”). 
21 See EMMETTE S. REDFORD, DUAL BANKING: A CASE STUDY IN FEDERALISM 1-3 (1966), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3137&context=lcp 
[https://perma.cc/UE4Z-7AVY]; Maria T. Vullo, Superintendent, N.Y. State Dept. of Fin. Services, 
Remarks at the CSBS Fintech Forum (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.csbs.org/maria-t-vullo-financial-
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to the task, the federal financial regulatory structure is not up to the task.22  
This Article seeks to analyze the shortcomings of this system through the lens 
of the student debt crisis and offers a roadmap for a new framework—one that not 
only better protects student loan borrowers, but guides a reimagining of the role of 
state financial regulation at large. 
 I. THE STUDENT DEBT CRISIS AS CONSUMER PROTECTION CRISIS 
While the fallout of the student debt crisis is most frequently presented as an 
uncertain event in the future or a looming economic calamity on the horizon,23 in 
truth, the student debt crisis is already upon on us: 
 Borrowers collectively owe more than $1.6 trillion in outstanding 
student loans, more than Americans collectively owe in credit card debt 
or auto loans.24  
 American families have seen their average student loan burden increase 
almost 150% since 2007.25  In fact, the rate of student loan growth on 
American households’ balance sheets is almost four times greater than 
what we saw in any other consumer credit category during that 
period.26 
 Nearly 45 million Americans receive a student loan bill each month.27  
 Student loan borrowers owe, on average, more than $35,000 apiece in 
student loan debt.28 
 3.2 million seniors owe more than $85 billion in student debt.29 
 Almost 10 million student loan borrowers across the country are in 
                                                                                                     
innovation-past-present-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/5HY2-VMQH]; see also Lauren Saunders, The 
Role of the States Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., (Dec. 2010), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/legislation/dodd-frank-role-
of-the-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HXV-6CGR] (“The partnership with the states is vital part of our 
system of federalism and our consumer protection system.”); Conference of State Bank Supervisors, The 
Role of State Financial Regulation (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.csbs.org/role-state-financial-regulation 
[https://perma.cc/YY35-8XS4]. 
22 See, e.g., Cmte. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Before the Committee on Banking Hous. 
and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 9 (2004) (testimony of Gavin M. Gee on behalf of the Conference of 
State Bank Supervisors) (“State supervision and regulation are essential to our decentralized system.  
State bank examiners are often the first to identify and address economic problems, including cases of 
consumer abuse.  We are the first responders to almost any problem in the financial system, from 
downturns in local industry or real estate markets to the emergence of scams that prey on senior citizens.  
We can and do respond to these problems much more quickly than the federal government.”). 
23 See, e.g., Allie Conti, What a Student Loan ‘Bubble’ Bursting Might Look Like, VICE (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvqw3x/what-a-student-loan-bubble-bursting-might-look-like 
[https://perma.cc/U6PF-7HQW]. 
24 See Consumer Credit – G.19 FED. RES. (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm [https://perma.cc/88HK-AXMJ]. 
25 2018 Student Loan Update, supra note 12. 
26 Id. 
27 Between Q4 2015 and Q4 2017, the number of student loan borrowers increased by 536,400. As of 
Q4 2017, there were 44.7 million student loan borrowers. See id. 
28 See generally id. 
29 See generally id.  
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default.30  
While the burden of student debt is widely felt, the impact of this burden is 
shouldered disproportionately by those in our society who have historically faced the 
largest economic and social barriers to opportunity.  Women make up half of all 
college students, and yet owe two-thirds of outstanding student loan debt.31  
Furthermore, the gender pay gap only serves to keep women in debt longer.32  
African-American and Latinx students borrow at higher rates than their white 
peers.33  Data shows that African-American borrowers owe nearly forty-five percent 
more student debt than white borrowers, and that disparity will more than triple in 
the years that follow.34  Yet the disparate effects of student debt do not fall solely 
along race and gender lines.  In rural America, the impact of student debt is 
particularly acute–in Maine, in Appalachia, and beyond.35 
The student debt crisis, however, is about more than debt loads and ballooning 
balances.  It is about more than higher education policy and college affordability.  
The student debt crisis is a significant–perhaps the most significant–consumer 
finance issue threatening our nation today. From student loan servicers36 to for-profit 
                                                                                                     
30 See Nat’l Student Loan Data Sys., supra note 13. 
31 See Kevin Miller, Women’s Student Debt Crisis in the United States, AM. ASS’N. U. WOMEN (May 
2017), https://www.aauw.org/research/deeper-in-debt [https://perma.cc/V8MC-TSFX]. 
32 Id.   
33 See Aissa Canchola & Seth Frotman, The Significant Impact of Student Debt on Communities of 
Color, CFPB (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/significant-impact-
student-debt-communities-color/ [https://perma.cc/3AH9-R8X6]; see also Sara Goldrick-Rab et al., The 
Color of Student Debt: Implications of Federal Loan Program Reforms for Black Students and 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, WIS. HOPE LAB (Sept. 2, 2014), 
https://news.education.wisc.edu/docs/WebDispenser/news-connections-
pdf/thecolorofstudentdebtdraft.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/B67F-YD94 ] (finding that the amount 
borrowed for college represents a much larger fraction of black students’ family income and their future 
earnings than it does for their white peers). 
34 See Judith Scott-Clayton & Jing Li, Black-White Disparity in Student Loan Debt More than Triples 
After graduation, BROOKINGS (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/black-white-
disparity-in-student-loan-debt-more-than-triples-after-graduation/ [https://perma.cc/K8KZ-6SHY]; see 
also INST. ON ASSETS AND SOC. POLICY, STALLING DREAMS: HOW STUDENT DEBT IS DISRUPTING LIFE 
CHANCES AND WIDENING THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP 4 (2019) 
https://heller.brandeis.edu/iasp/pdfs/racial-wealth-equity/racial-wealth-gap/stallingdreams-how-student-
debt-is-disrupting-lifechances.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3AT-WAX8] (illustrating data that borrowers of 
color disproportionately struggle in repayment, such that 20 years after starting college, typical Black 
borrowers still owe 95 percent of their original student debt balance, while typical white borrowers have 
paid down almost 95 percent of the original balance). 
35 See PJ Tabit & Josh Winters, “Rural Brain Drain”: Examining Millennial Migration Patterns and 
Student Loan Debt, FED. RES. BD., CONSUMER & COMMUNITY CONTEXT, 7-14 (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/consumer-community-context-201901.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N4YS-FG5Q]; see also Cassidy Morrison, Student Debt Is Keeping Doctors from 
Rural Areas, WASH. EXAMINER (June 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/student-
debt-is-keeping-doctors-from-rural-areas [https://perma.cc/47EA-LP2M]; Low Wages, Student Debt 
Fuel Vet Shortage in Rural Missouri, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 25, 2019), 
https://www.apnews.com/0da140722da043e981f3881d1b75d6c3 [https://perma.cc/3QCT-VMSL]. 
36 See, e.g., Consent Order at 9, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013 (Aug. 22, 2016) 
(Respondent “maximized late fees incurred by many consumers”); Complaint at 18, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM, 2018 WL 2088760 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (stating 
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schools,37 from debt collectors38 to private student lenders,39 from private equity 
                                                                                                     
“Navient’s compensation policies for its customer service representatives have incentivized them to 
push numerous borrowers to forbearance without adequately exploring income-driven repayment plans 
with those borrowers, and in some cases, without even mentioning income-driven repayment plans at 
all”) Complaint at 11, California v. Navient Corp., No. CGC-18-567732 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2018) (stating 
“Navient’s compensation policies for customer service representatives incentivized this misconduct.”); 
Complaint at 13, Massachusetts v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 34 Mass.L.Rptr. 616 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. 2018) (No. 1784-cv-02682) (“PHEAA has wrongfully held borrowers’ money that it was not 
entitled to collect.”); Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Bus. Oversight, California Department of Business 
Oversight Sues Loan Servicer PHEAA/Fedloan (Apr. 2, 2020), https://dbo.ca.gov/2020/04/02/california-
department-of-business-oversight-sues-student-loan-servicer-pheaa-fedloan/ [https://perma.cc/ZU33-
T6XQ]; Press Release, N.Y. St. Off. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James and Superintendent Vullo 
Announce $9 Million Settlement of Federal Student Loan Servicing Claims with Acs Education Services 
(Jan. 4, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-and-superintendent-vullo-
announce-9-million-settlement [https://perma.cc/9U6U-TLXM]; see also Seth Frotman, Every Tool at 
its Disposal: The Case for a Student Loan Servicing Rulemaking, 31 LOYOLA CONSUMER L. REV. 553 
(2019) (documenting CFPB allegations of illegal servicing practices).  
37 See, e.g., Consent Decree at 6, Bridgepoint Education, Inc., CFPB No. 2016- CFPB-0016 (Sept. 9, 
2016); Complaint at 10, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 14-4194, 2015 WL 
10854380 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (stating “[r]egardless of whether students were able to repay the private 
student loans, Corinthian would profit from the increased availability of Title IV monies”); Complaint at 
26, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F.Supp.3d 878 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (No. 
1:14-cv-292) (stating “[w]hile ITT remains profitable—it reaped approximately $59 million in net 
income during 2013—former ITT students, having been coerced by ITT into the ITT Private Loans, face 
a high likelihood of defaulting”); Complaint, United States v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., No. 07-461 (W.D. Pa. 
2013); Complaint at 3, California v. Ashford Univ., LLC, No. RG17883963, 2017 WL 5903538 (Cal. 
Super. 2017); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5 Million to 
Settle Claims of Illegal Recruiting, Consumer Fraud and Other Violations (Nov. 16, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/profit-college-company-pay-955-million-settle-claims-illegal-recruiting-
consumer-fraud-and [https://perma.cc/H4WY-P9ZG ]; Press Release, Md Off. Att’y Gen., AG Frosh: 
$1.4 Million in Loans Forgiven for Nearly 1,000 Maryland Students (Nov. 16, 2015), 
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Press/2015/111615.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7ZD-GMMW]. 
38 See, e.g., Consent Order, Transworld Systems, Inc., CFPB No. 2017-CFPB-0018 (Sept. 18, 2017) (“In 
support of many of these lawsuits, [Transworld] executed affidavits that falsely claimed personal 
knowledge of the account records and the consumer's debt, and, in many cases, personal knowledge of 
the chain of assignments establishing ownership of the loans.”). Complaint at 45, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM (M.D. Pa. 2018) (“Pioneer’s false promises that 
rehabilitation would remove all adverse information regarding the borrowers’ loans from their credit 
reports.”); Complaint at 70, Illinois v. Navient Corp., No. 17-CH-00761 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017) (“Pioneer 
Credit Recovery, and General Revenue Corporation's unfair and deceptive debt collection practices.”); 
Press Release, Minnesota Commerce Department, Minnesota Commerce Department Announces Action 
Against Improper Student Loan Debt Collections (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://mn.gov/commerce/media/news/?id=17-307713 (“Minnesota Commerce [Department] . . . and 
regulators in four other states have reached a $500,000 joint settlement with two subsidiaries of iQor 
Holdings Inc. for improper debt collection practices, including making abusive and harassing phone 
calls to increase student loan payments.”).  
39 See, e.g., Consent Judgment, CFPB v. Nat. Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust, No. 1:17-cv-01323-
UNA (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2017); Consent Order, Citibank, N.A., CFPB No. 2017-CFPB0021 (Nov. 21, 
2017); Consent Order, Discover Bank, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0016 (July 22, 2015); Complaint at 10, 
Washington v. Navient Corp., No. 17-2-01115-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 2017) (“From 2006-2007 Sallie 
Mae claimed 42% of the private student loan market by pursuing an unfair and deceptive subprime 
lending strategy of providing expensive subprime loans to vulnerable borrowers even though Sallie Mae 
knew many — even most — of those loans would default.”).  
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firms40 to debt relief scams41 — entire industries have built their profit models around 
taking advantage of student loan borrowers.42  Their practices collectively add 
billions of dollars of additional student debt to household balance sheets, damaging 
the financial future of an entire generation.43  
Throughout America, big banks and small scams hurt millions of borrowers at 
every single point in their financial lives–from the day a student receives her first bill 
until the day she pays off her last loan.  Collectively, tens of millions of borrowers 
are trapped in a system where they have fewer rights and protections than exist in 
other markets–a feature recognized by regulators,44 law enforcement officials,45 
                                                                                                     
40 See, e.g., CFPB Takes Action Against Aequitas Capital Management for Aiding Corinthian Colleges' 
Predatory Lending Scheme, CFPB (Aug. 17 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-aequitas-capital-management-aiding-corinthian-colleges-
predatory-lending-scheme/; AG Rosenblum Announces $192 Million Aequitas Settlement; $2.1 Million 
for Oregon Students OR. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.doj.state.or.us/media-
home/news-media-releases/ag-rosenblum-announces-192-million-aequitas-settlement-2-1-million-
oregon-students/; see also Charlie Eaton, Sabrina Howell & Constantine Yannelis, When Investor 
Incentives and Consumer Interests Diverge: Private Equity in Higher Education, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Res. Working Paper No. 24976, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24976 [https://perma.cc/KSV7-
MBPT]. 
41 See, e.g., Complaint, CFPB v. IrvineWebWorks, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-1967 (Dec. 11, 2014); AG 
Ferguson Surpasses $1 Million in Student-Borrower Recoveries, WASH. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Jan. 5, 
2017), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-surpasses-1-million-student-
borrowerrecoveries [https://perma.cc/F5YZ-UXVN ] (“Since November 2015, Ferguson has brought 
lawsuits or resolved allegations against 15 out-of-state student loan adjusters for violating Washington’s 
Debt Adjustment Act and Consumer Protection Act by charging illegal fees for debt adjusting and 
ignoring legal obligations to inform customers of important rights.”); CFPB Takes Action to Shut Down 
Illegal Student Debt Relief Scheme, CFPB (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-to-shut-down-illegal-student-debt-relief-scheme/; State Law 
Enforcement Partners Announce Nationwide Crackdown on Student Loan Debt Relief Scams, FTC (Oct. 
13, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/10/ftc-state-law-enforcement-partners-
announce-nationwide-crackdown.  
42 See, e.g., Testimony of Seth Frotman, Before H. Comm. Financial Services 116th Cong. (2019). 
43 See, e.g., Complaint at 23, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM 
(M.D. Pa. 2018) (stating “[a]t the conclusion of those forbearances, Navient had added nearly four 
billion dollars of unpaid interest to the principal balance of their loans”). 
44 See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING 103 (2015) 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_student-loan-servicing-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UC2U-TEN5 ] (“[P]olicymakers have undertaken broad-based legislative and 
regulatory efforts to strengthen applicable federal consumer financial laws protecting consumers in the 
servicing of mortgages and credit cards. However, for student loan borrowers, there is no existing, 
comprehensive federal statutory or regulatory framework providing consistent standards for the 
servicing of all student loans.”); Letter from Conn. Dep’t of Banking Counsel Bruce H. Adams to the 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau in response to a Request for Information Regarding Student Loan Servicing 
(July 13, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=CFPB-2015-0021-
0381&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf. 
45 See, e.g., Letter from Lisa Madigan & Bob Ferguson to CFPB in Response to a Request for 
Information Regarding Student Loan Servicing, CFPB-2015-0021-0376 (July 13, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=CFPB-2015-0021- 
0376&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“Unlike in similar financial service industries, there is 
little regulation of specific student loan servicer conduct, such as the handling and application of 
payments.”). 
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lawmakers,46 scholars,47 and consumer advocates.48  
To understand the contours of modern-day student loan law and regulation, we 
must first explore how we got here.  For decades, the higher education finance sector 
was marked by a fragmented oversight regime in which competing regulators at 
varying levels of government were supposed to oversee the different segments and 
players in the higher education finance market.49  Bank lenders would have one 
regulator.50  Non-bank lenders another.51  Servicers and debt collectors, in some 
cases, yet another.52  In reality, the demands of student loan borrowers were often 
overshadowed by regulators’ emergent need to oversee larger markets or address 
“higher priorities.”53  Furthermore, in the first decades of the 21st century, the 
substantial growth of non-bank financial institutions meant that much of student 
finance could operate in the shadows outside of regulators’ purview–the state 
regulatory infrastructure that purported to fill in federal regulators’ blind spots lacked 
the reach to oversee even the largest players. All of this was compounded by 
regulators’ lack of statutory authorities to promulgate timely and robust regulations 
                                                                                                     
46 See, e.g., Steve Fenberg & Faith Winter, Opinion, Colorado Will Lead the Effort to End the Student 
Debt Crisis, COLO. SUN (Apr. 11, 2019), https://coloradosun.com/2019/04/11/student-debt-steve-
fenberg-faith-winter/ [https://perma.cc/HPP7-YXN8]; Letter from Congresswoman Susan Davis to 
Director Cordray in Response to a Request for Information Regarding Student Loan Servicing, CFPB-
2015-0021-0379 (July 13, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=CFPB-
2015-0021-0379&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[I]t is important the Bureau also put in 
place strong rules for all borrowers, regardless of loan type or who owns their loans. As a prime 
example, the Bureau should look to our work in the CARD Act to help inform how they should best 
protect borrowers.”). 
47 See, e.g., Letter from Alan White et al., to the CFPB in Response to a Request for Information 
Regarding Student Loan Servicing, CFPB-2015-0021-6929 (July 23, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB2015-0021-6929. 
48 See, e.g., Comment to CFPB Regarding Student Loan Servicing, CFPB-2015-0021-6840 NAT’L 
CONSUMER L. CTR. (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=CFPB-
2015-0021- 6840&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“The absence of clear borrower 
protections contrasts with other consumer credit areas such as credit cards and mortgages.”); Letter from 
Consumers Union to the CFPB in Response to a Request for Information Regarding Student Loan 
Servicing, CFPB-2015-0021-7592 (Jul. 15, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=CFPB-2015-0021- 
7592&attachmentNumber=4&contentType=pdf (“The Bureau rightly notes that other kinds of consumer 
debt come with protections related to repayment and servicing. By contrast, for people who took out 
loans to get an education, there are fewer protections and the system is often tough to navigate – as a 
result, these borrowers may be at the mercy of their servicers.”); see also Broken Promises, supra note 
16. 
49 CFPB, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC INPUT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
REFORM 141 (2015)  https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_student-loan-servicing-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YL8T-EVDK ] (“Historically, state and federal regulatory agencies have largely 
overseen student loan servicers as service providers to or as affiliates of financial institutions under their 
purview. This may have fragmented oversight responsibilities and inadvertently created barriers for 
regulators and law enforcement agencies seeking to understand and improve practices for all student 
loan borrowers.”). 
50 Id. at 140-42. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See generally id. at 141.  
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that could have protected borrowers both as they took out loans and then as they tried 
to pay them back.54  Finally, regulators were often left with little ability to hold 
student loan companies accountable when they violated borrowers’ rights, or for 
borrowers themselves to seek help when companies treated them unfairly.55 
 Perhaps most importantly, policymakers fell back on the dangerously misguided 
notion that one of the nation’s largest creditors, the United States Department of 
Education, could be a constructive partner in overseeing the private companies in the 
student loan market.56  Instead, policymakers failed to recognize the importance of 
strong independent oversight free from conflicts, competing policy priorities, or 
budgetary calculus.  Looking back, the results are striking: two decades of lax 
oversight, questionable policy decisions, and a long series of actions that allowed 
borrowers’ rights to be subordinated to the demands of the student loan industry.57  
Into this perfect storm, over ten million new borrowers were added in just the last 
decade.58  
II. ENTER THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, WHITHER THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
The nation’s student debt crisis is inextricably linked to the global economic 
meltdown of the late 2000s.59  First, and most clearly, a toxic mix of Wall Street-
                                                                                                     
54 See CFPB, JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON STUDENT LOAN SERVICING 3 (2015), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_treasury_education-joint-statement-of-principles-on-
student-loan-servicing.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4UP-GZ6X ] (“Student loan servicers, whether for-profit, 
not-for-profit or government agencies, should be accountable for serving borrowers fairly, efficiently 
and effectively.  If servicers fall short and violate federal or state consumer financial laws, the HEA, 
contractual requirements, or federal regulations, then borrowers, federal and state agencies and 
regulators, and law enforcement officials should have access to appropriate channels for recourse, as 
authorized under law.”). 
55 See generally Frotman, Every Tool at Its Disposal, supra note 36, at 571 (“Federal higher education 
law does not provide borrowers with a private remedy to address breakdowns when they occur.  Despite 
far-reaching and powerful protections against economic distress, including income-driven repayment 
and debt cancellation options, student loan borrowers continue to struggle and default at near-historic 
levels. Observers have attributed this persistent distress, in part, to the limited mechanisms available to 
consumers when a student loan servicer fails to effectively and timely facilitate access to borrowers’ 
repayment rights.”). 
56 See generally Broken Promises, supra note 16, at 838-40.  
57 See, e.g., Ben Kaufman, Setting the Record Straight: ED’s Failures in Student Borrower Protection, 
STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR. DOMINO BLOG (Nov. 26, 2019), https://protectborrowers.org/setting-
the-record-straight-eds-failures-in-student-borrower-protection/ [https://perma.cc/A5ZG-PC79]. 
58 Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, supra note 11. 
59 See Student Loan Debt Crisis: How Did We Get Here?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 30, 2019), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/student-loan-debt-crisis-how-did-we-get-here/ [https://perma.cc/7EC7-
GHXT ] (“The explosion in the amount of student debt held by Americans was fueled by the financial 
crisis a decade ago, and economists warn the burden on borrowers threatens the economy as a whole as 
consumers struggle to repay their loans.”); Rohit Chopra, Prepared Remarks by Rohit Chopra Before 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, CFPB (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/student-loan-ombudsman-rohit-chopra-before-the-federal-reserve-bank-of-st-louis/ 
[https://perma.cc/RT8A-7XC2] (“Rising student debt burdens may prove to be one of the more painful 
aftershocks of the Great Recession, especially if left unaddressed”); see also, e.g., Jillian Berman, How 
the Great Recession Turned America’s Student-Loan Problem into a $1.5 Trillion Crisis, WALL ST. J.: 
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funded student loan debt left millions of borrowers on the hook in the years leading 
up to the crisis and remains an albatross around their financial lives a decade later.60  
Second, beneath the surface, the Great Recession also wreaked havoc upon state 
government balance sheets–precipitating the slashing of state higher education 
budgets that continue to drive ballooning levels of student debt owed by students 
enrolled in college today.61  Third, the overhaul of the federal financial regulatory 
system and the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or 
“Bureau”) is both a clear legacy of the financial crisis62 and arguably the most 
                                                                                                     
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/3-ways-the-great-recession-
turned-americas-student-loan-problem-into-a-crisis-2018-09-06 [https://perma.cc/ZR9E-7RSY]. 
60 See Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, As Paperwork Goes Missing, Private Student Loan 





work%20is%20missing (“Tens of thousands of people who took out private loans to pay for college but 
have not been able to keep up payments may get their debts wiped away because critical paperwork is 
missing. The troubled loans, which total at least $5 billion, are at the center of a protracted legal dispute 
between the student borrowers and a group of creditors who have aggressively pursued them in court 
after they fell behind on payments.”); see also Shahien Nasiripour, Wall Street is Fighting a CFPB Deal 
Over Billions in Defaulted Student Loans, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-08/wall-street-is-fighting-a-cfpb-deal-over-billions-
in-defaulted-student-loans [https://perma.cc/V4DR-TTGP] (“It seemed like the kind of case regulators 
had resolved countless times before: Debt collectors are accused of using flawed documentation and 
lawsuits to collect unpaid loans. A fine is levied, a promise to reform is made, and everyone moves on. 
Not this time. A maelstrom of banks, insurers, debt collectors, and hedge funds enveloped the U.S. 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau when it tried to settle allegations of shoddy collection practices 
on billions of dollars in student loans. A novel settlement proposal between the regulator and a private 
equity firm meant to clear up the matter has Wall Street warning of expensive consequences for future 
student borrowers.”). 
61 See, e.g., A Lost Decade in Higher Education Funding, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,  
https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/a-lost-decade-in-higher-education-funding 
[https://perma.cc/5X4X-VY6U ] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) (“A decade since the Great Recession hit, 
state spending on public colleges and universities remains well below historic levels, despite recent 
increases.”); New Report Finds State Funding for Higher Education Has Only Halfway Recovered in the 
Decade Since the Great Recession, SHEEO,  https://sheeo.org/new-report-finds-state-funding-for-higher-
education-has-only-halfway-recovered-in-the-decade-since-the-great-recession/ 
[https://perma.cc/XXA2-EMPA ] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) (“[I]t’s clear that a heavy reliance on 
tuition revenue has become the new norm for how state higher education systems are funded.”); Bo 
Zhao, Consequences of State Disinvestment in Public Higher Education: Lessons for the New England 
States, NEW ENGLAND PUB. POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 2019), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/new-
england-public-policy-center-research-report/2019/consequences-of-state-disinvestment-in-public-
higher-education.aspx [https://perma.cc/JQ9Y-7ANB ] (“Research in this report shows that reductions 
in state appropriations have resulted in higher tuition and fees, greater student loan debt.”). 
62 See, e.g., Raj Date, Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis: The Need for the CFPB, CFPB (Sept. 
15, 2011), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/lessons-learned-from-the-financial-
crisis-the-need-for-the-cfpb/ [https://perma.cc/R6UM-H3WQ ] (“Prior to the crisis, no single agency 
had effective tools to regulate and oversee the whole consumer finance market, and consumer protection 
was not anyone’s top priority. The result was a system where no one was sufficiently accountable for 
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important consumer protection development in the twenty-year history of the modern 
student loan market.63  Responding to the systematic breakdowns of a regulatory 
system that failed to halt widespread illegal practices, leading to trillions in lost 
wealth, Congress passed a once-in-a-generation realignment of the nation’s financial 
oversight framework.64  This included the creation of the CFPB.65  In the eyes of its 
framers, the CFPB would be a new federal agency tasked with protecting the 
hundreds of millions of consumers in this country.66  Congress specifically designed 
the Bureau with the tools, resources, and authorities to achieve such an ambitious 
goal.67   
                                                                                                     
getting the job done. At the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, we’ve been given that important 
responsibility.”). 
63 See Andrew Kreighbaum, Small Agency, Big Impact, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 28, 2016),  
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/09/28/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-plays-outsize-
role-regulator-profits-and-loan [https://perma.cc/9ZLR-8JPA ] (“In the latter half of the 2000s, it 
became commonplace for regulators and policy analysts to refer to the “Wild West” landscape of 
student lending, especially private student loans. A decade later, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau has announced itself as the new sheriff in town to the student loan industry and the for-profit 
colleges that fueled it.”). 
64 See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES (2009), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20090312/z1.pdf (“For 2008 as a 
whole, household net worth fell $11.2 trillion.”); see also Remarks by Deputy Secretary Sarah Bloom 
Raskin at the National Foundation for Credit Counseling 50th Annual Leaders’ Conference, U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
jl0186.aspx (“The financial crisis exposed the real dangers from having a system with misaligned 
incentives and shoddy oversight of complex markets.  Those fundamental flaws took a toll on a crucial 
wealth-building asset—the home—and in their wake we were left with households with damaged 
balance sheets and a slow, uneven recovery—indicative of a slow rebuilding of household wealth.  We 
need to ensure that we design a credit system that can be navigated and that functions efficiently for all 
participants in all economic environments.”); Treasury Deputy Secretary Neal Wolin Written Testimony 
before the Senate Banking Committee on “Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act”, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg881.aspx [https://perma.cc/SX5B-XUP2 ] (“The Act builds a stronger 
financial system by addressing major gaps and weaknesses in regulation that helped cause the financial 
crisis that led to the recession. It puts in place buffers and safeguards to reduce the chance that another 
generation will have to go through a crisis of similar magnitude.”). 
65 See e.g., Hearing on the Creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, 111th  Cong., (2009), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg54789/pdf/CHRG-111shrg54789.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5DFQ-CTTW] (“[W]e are taking an important step in our efforts to modernize our 
financial regulatory system . . . . That is why the first piece of the Administration’s comprehensive plan 
to rebuild our regulatory regime.”); BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ET AL., 
JOINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 301-326 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT (Apr. 2011), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/banker-
education/files/pub-joint-implement-plan-dodd-frank-sec-301-326.pdf. 
66 See, e.g., Data Point: Credit Invisibles, CFPB, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-
point-credit-invisibles.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B4J-X2TX ] (“Our estimates suggest that approximately 
188.6 million Americans have credit records at one of the NCRAs that can be scored by the 
commercially-available model that informs our analysis. This represents over 80 percent of the adult 
population.”); see also Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. 5 (Summer 2007), 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ [https://perma.cc/GR7W-794K].  
67 See Leonard J. Kennedy, et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for 
the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2012) (“The recent financial crisis, the 
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First, the Bureau would be “independent” and shielded from undue political 
influence as it undertook its mission.68  Second, the Bureau would have only one 
mission: administering and enforcing the nation’s consumer protection statutes.69  It 
would not have the dual mandate of ensuring the “safety and soundness” of the 
financial institutions it oversaw, which too often left consumer financial protection 
deprioritized and trumped by the concerns of protecting banking sector profits.70  
Third, the Bureau would have authority over both the largest depository and non-
depository institutions, cinching closed a hole in the regulatory patchwork that 
                                                                                                     
worst since the Great Depression, was partly the result of federal regulatory failure.  The consequences 
were catastrophic.  Congress responded by passing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), which included the creation of a new regulatory agency charged with 
ensuring that ‘all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services that 
are ‘fair, transparent, and competitive.’”); Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 253, 254 (2018) (“When Congress created the CFPB, 
the drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act paid close attention to the architecture of consumer financial 
protection. That structure reflects a conscious decision to correct the regulatory failings of the past.”); 
Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical 
Review, 90 TULANE L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2016) (“In the wake of this financial catastrophe, the public 
demanded, and the United States Congress delivered, the most transformative financial reform since the 
1930s.  While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) included 
many changes, its centerpiece was the creation of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB or Bureau.”).  
68 See Hosea H. Harvey, Constitutionalizing Consumer Financial Protection: The Case for the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2429, 2430 (2019) (“Furthermore, because 
its design-features include insulation from congressional appropriation review and for-cause executive 
removal power, the agency is largely protected from outside influence, except perhaps during the 
nomination process of its singular director.”); see also Michael Barr, Why the CFPB is Constitutional, 
DEMOCRACY (Apr. 24, 2017), https://democracyjournal.org/briefing-book/why-the-cfpb-is-
constitutional/ [https://perma.cc/UMS8-7LMZ] (“Congress sought to make the consumer bureau truly 
independent—to minimize the risk that the agency would be ‘captured’ by the financial firms it 
regulates through pressure on Congress or on the President.”). 
69 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2018); see also Megan Slack, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 101: Why 
We Need a Consumer Watchdog, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2012),  
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/01/04/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-101-why-
we-need-consumer-watchdog  [https://perma.cc/R4P2-JEMR ] (“CFPB will be the single, consumer-
focused regulating authority, consolidating the existing authorities scattered throughout the Federal 
government under one roof.”). 
70 See, e.g., Creating the Consumer Bureau, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-
bureau/creatingthebureau/  [https://perma.cc/XPN3-J5XH] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) (“In June 2009, 
President Obama proposed to address failures of consumer protection by establishing a new financial 
agency to focus directly on consumers, rather than on bank safety and soundness or on monetary 
policy.”); ADAM J. LEVITIN, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY 4 (2009),  
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/08/6/pewlevitancfpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2V6-
ERYC] (“For federal banking regulators, there is a conflict between their primary mission—bank safety-
and-soundness—and the consumer protection mission.  Safety-and-soundness ultimately means 
profitability because only profitable financial institutions can be safe and sound.  Unfair, deceptive, and 
abusive practices, however, can be highly profitable; that is the only reason to engage in them.  If they 
are even mildly profitable, the regulatory and reputational risk would make the practice not worthwhile.  
Placing the two missions together in a single agency ensures that one will trump the other, and 
historically consumer protection has not won out, except when the most egregious practices are at 
stake.”). 
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previously left trillion-dollar markets with little federal oversight.71  Finally, the 
Bureau would have broad jurisdiction over “consumer financial products or 
services,” as well as the ability to use any of its authorities—including supervision, 
enforcement, or rulemaking—to intervene in any and each market that fell within its 
purview.72  
The Bureau’s authorizing law enabled it to police markets for the expansive 
array of consumer financial products at the center of hundreds of millions of 
Americans’ lives, ranging from mortgages to money orders,73 credit cards to credit 
reporting,74 and prepaid cards to payday loans.75  As described below, Congress also 
granted the new Consumer Bureau expansive authority to regulate the student loan 
market.76  The Bureau’s work has touched all aspects of the student loan market, 
ranging from banks to nonbanks, and lenders to servicers, even including both 
student loan debt collectors and the companies that run for-profit schools.77  It has 
                                                                                                     
71 See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND 
ECON. CRISIS 414 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (“For 
example, high-risk, nontraditional mortgage lending by nonbank lenders flourished in the 2000s and did 
tremendous damage in an ineffectively regulated environment, contributing to the financial crisis.”); see 
also Michael S. Barr, Financial Reform: Making the System Safer and Fairer, RSF: THE RUSSELL SAGE 
FOUND. J. OF THE SOC. SCI. 3 at 1, 3-4 (2017).   
72 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2018); see also Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law 
Enforcement: An Empirical Review, supra note 67, at 1071 (discussing CFPB’s broad authority: “At the 
Bureau, our bigger and more flexible toolbox includes research reports, rulemaking, market guidance, 
consumer education and empowerment, and ability to supervise and examine both large banks, and 
many nonbank institutions.”); Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An 
Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 322 (2013) (analyzing Bureau’s broad authorities); 
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 115TH  CONG., CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU IN 
PERSPECTIVE 10 (2017) https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/cfpb_staff_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NS8U-64FG ] (“Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act established the Consumer Bureau as 
the first ever independent Federal agency provided with rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement 
authorities over the offering and provision of consumer financial products and services.”). 
73 See 12 C.F.R. § 1003 (2015); 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2013); 12 C.F.R. §1090 (2014). 
74 See 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2016); 12 C.F.R. § 1041 (2017). 
75 See 12 C.F.R. § 1090 (2013). 
76 Seth Frotman, Every Tool at its Disposal: The Case for a Student Loan Servicing Rulemaking, 31 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 551, 551-52, 560-61 (2019) (analyzing the Bureau’s jurisdiction over the 
student loan market).  
77 See, e.g., CFPB Orders Discover Bank to Pay $18.5 Million for Illegal Student Loan Servicing 
Practices, CFPB (Jul. 22, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-
discover-bank-to-pay-18-5-million-for-illegal-student-loan-servicing-practices/ [https://perma.cc/45CU-
4AWX] (discussing banks); CFPB Takes Action Against Citibank for Student Loan Servicing Failures 
That Harmed Borrowers, CFPB (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-citibank-student-loan-servicing-failures-harmed-borrowers/ 
[https://perma.cc/J97L-3TQJ] (discussing servicers); CFPB Takes Action Against Student Financial Aid 
Services, Inc. for Illegal Recurring Billing Scheme, CFPB (Jul. 23, 2015),  
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-student-financial-aid-
services-inc-for-illegal-recurring-billing-scheme/ [https://perma.cc/L7HU-TRCK]; Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Takes Action Against Bridgepoint Education, Inc. for Illegal Student Lending 
Practices, CFPB (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-takes-action-against-bridgepoint-education-inc-illegal-student-lending-
practices/ [https://perma.cc/3PYN-H2XY ] (discussing lenders).  
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taken enforcement action against those who broke the law, from small scammers to 
large financial institutions like Wells Fargo, Discover, and Navient.78 
From when it opened its doors in 2011 until late 2017, when Director Richard 
Cordray resigned, the CFPB returned more than $12 billion to defrauded consumers, 
including $750 million to student loan borrowers.79  And more than any one headline 
in an individual enforcement action, the Bureau’s success demonstrated that with 
independence, ample resources, and the right tools and authorities, a financial 
regulator could step in to fill the gaps that had once left student loan borrowers on 
the outside of the regulated financial system. 
Unfortunately, from December 2017 onward, the Bureau’s political leadership 
undermined a significant amount of this work.80  The Bureau removed a student loan 
servicing rulemaking from its unified regulatory agenda that would have provided 
enhanced protections and disclosures for all student loan borrowers.81   
The Director chose to no longer supervise the largest companies managing over 
a trillion dollars in student debt, caving to political pressure from the United States 
Department of Education.82  The Bureau withdrew its proposed plans to monitor and 
shine a light on the largest players in the student loan servicing market.83  Since 
Trump Administration officials assumed control of the CFPB, the few enforcement 
actions against student loan companies were marked by little restitution and were 
                                                                                                     
78 See, e.g., Complaint at 18, In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013, 9 (Aug. 22, 
2016) (“Respondent[ ] . . . maximized late fees incurred by many consumers.”); In re Discover Bank, 
CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0016, 1 (July 22, 2015); Complaint, CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-
RDM (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2017). 
79 See CFPB, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN 2-3 (Oct. 2017), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_annual-report_student-loan-ombudsman_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87ZG-DK6M]; see also Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm. 116th Cong. 2 
(2019) (statement of Seth Frotman), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba00-
wstate-frotmans-20190307.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U7U-J2LN]. 
80 See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., supra note 79, at 3; Joint Statement: Nation’s Top 
Student Loan Watchdog Post Remains Vacant 150 Days After CFPB Director Promised to “Quickly” 
Fill the Role, AMS. FOR FIN. REFORM (Aug. 2, 2019), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2019/08/joint-
statement-nations-top-student-loan-watchdog-post-remains-vacant-150-days-cfpb-director-promised-
quickly-fill-role/ [https://perma.cc/LE2H-SRBV]. 
81 See Michael Stratford, CFPB Gives up on Plans to Regulate Student Loan Servicers, POLITICOPRO 
(May 9, 2018), https://subscriber.politicopro.com/education/article/2018/05/cfpb-gives-up-on-plans-to-
regulate-student-loan-15 servicers-526274.  
82 See Chris Arnold, Exclusive: Turf War Blocked CFPB from Helping Fix Student Loan Forgiveness 
Program, NPR (Oct. 15, 2019),  https://www.npr.org/2019/10/15/769326896/exclusive-turf-war-
blocked-cfpb-from-helping-fix-student-loan-forgiveness-progra [https://perma.cc/E6NL-E5HT]; Student 
Debt Crisis v. CFPB and Dep’t of Educ., DEMOCRACY FORWARD 
https://democracyforward.org/lawsuits/student-debt-crisis-v-cfpb-education/ [https://perma.cc/V7BQ-
AEWE ] (last visited Mar. 14, 2020); Senators Press CFPB to Dig Into Problems with Public Service 
Student Loan Program, NPR (Oct 17, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/771021135?storyId=771021135&ft=nprml&f=771021135?storyId=771
021135&ft=nprml&f=771021135 [https://perma.cc/R7XA-THZV]. 
83 Putting Consumers First? A Semi-Annual Review of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: 
Hearing Before H. Comm. Of Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. 5 (2019).  
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narrowly focused on smaller entities in the sector.84 
Even as the Bureau has engaged in a hasty and ideologically driven retreat from 
its duties in the student loan marketplace, the scope of the student debt crisis has 
continued to expand.  For example, student loan defaults have increased by double 
digits,85 the pace of lawsuits alleging illegal practices by student loan companies 
continues to intensify,86 and the struggles of tens of millions of student loan 
borrowers only gained more prominence.87   
III. STATES MUST ACT 
Stepping into this void are state policymakers – legislators, law enforcement 
                                                                                                     
84 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Settles with Conduent Education Services, CFPB (May 1, 
2019),  https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-settles-conduent-education-
services [https://perma.cc/CV39-GK2D]; see also CFPB Law Enforcement Plummets Under Trump 
Administration, CONSUMER FED’N OF AMERICA (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://consumerfed.org/press_release/16137/ [https://perma.cc/37BP-TERK]; MAJORITY STAFF OF THE 
COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 116TH CONG., SETTLING FOR NOTHING: HOW KRANINGER’S CFPB LEAVES 
CONSUMERS HIGH AND DRY 7 (2019); CFPB Law Enforcement Plummets Under Trump Administration, 
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/16137/. But see Jana 
Bernelio, New York AG: Student Loan Servicer Agrees to $9m Settlement for Misleading Borrowers, 
CNY CENTRAL (Jan. 4, 2019), https://cnycentral.com/news/local/new-york-ag-student-loan-servicer-
agrees-to-9m-settlement-for-misleading-borrowers. 
85 Nat’l Student Loan Data Sys., Direct Loans Entering Default, STUDENTAID.GOV 
https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/DLEnteringDefaults.xls [https://perma.cc/B4KS-S52M] (last 
visited June 7, 2020). 
86 See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, New York Sues Student Loan Servicer for ‘Abusive’ Acts, NY TIMES (Oct. 3, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/business/student-loans-forgiveness-pheaa.html 
[https://perma.cc/J7AS-ZQK8]; see also Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, American Federation of Teachers 
Sues Betsy DeVos over Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, WASH. POST (Jul. 11, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/07/11/american-federation-teachers-sues-betsy-devos-
over-public-service-loan-forgiveness-program/ [https://perma.cc/46HE-9LLK]; Stacy Cowley, 
California Will Be Fourth State to Sue Navient Over Student Loans, NY TIMES (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/business/navient-student-loans-california.html. 
87 See, e.g., Hua Hsu, Student Debt is Transforming the American Family, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 2, 
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/09/student-debt-is-transforming-the-american-
family [https://perma.cc/9JGQ-MS4M]; see also Lance Frank, As Student Loan Debt Hits Record 
Levels, Some Americans Are Putting Off Home Buying and Retirement – Will They Be Able to Get Out 
from Under Crippling Loans?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 30, 2019), 
https://www.viacomcbspressexpress.com/cbs-news/releases/view?id=52571[https://perma.cc/2MN8-
UT5V]; Diana Hembree, New Report Finds Student Debt Burden Has ‘Disastrous Domino Effect’ on 
Millions of Americans, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dianahembree/2018/11/01/new-report-finds-student-debt-burden-has-
disastrous-domino-effect-on-millions-of-americans/#20638e8012d1[https://perma.cc/J7RF-S47Y]; 
Christopher Ingraham, 7 ways $1.6 trillion in student loan debt affects the U.S. economy, WASH. POST 
(June 25, 2019),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/06/25/heres-what-trillion-student-
loan-debt-is-doing-us-economy/ [https://perma.cc/XXQ7-W7ZK];  Harameet Kaur, The Student Loan 
Debt is $1.6 Trillion and People are Struggling to Pay It Down, CNN (Jan. 19, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/19/us/student-loan-slow-repayment-moodys-trnd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/AY6T-X5SS]; Elissa Nadworny, These Are the People Struggling the Most to Pay 
Back Student Loans, NPR ME. PUB. (July 9, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/09/738985632/these-
are-the-people-struggling-the-most-to-pay-back-student-loans [https://perma.cc/BHS7-X2KG].  
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officials, and banking regulators – accelerating efforts to tackle the crisis that began 
in earnest only a few years earlier.  
For more than a hundred years, the American financial system has recognized 
the critical role that states play in overseeing financial markets.88  Every state’s police 
power is founded on the need to protect the general well-being of its citizens,89 
including the power to oversee the companies responsible for the financial futures of 
those citizens.90  As the United States Supreme Court explained four decades ago, 
“banking and related financial activities are of profound local concern . . . . [S]ound 
financial institutions and honest financial practices are essential to the health of any 
State’s economy and to the well-being of its people.”91 
The impact of student debt on the lives and livelihoods of borrowers is no longer 
possible to ignore or deny.  Research shows that student loan borrowers are less 
likely to buy homes,92 start families,93 or save for retirement.94  They are less likely 
                                                                                                     
88 See, e.g., Alejandro Komai & Gary Richardson, A Brief History of Regulations Regarding Financial 
Markets in the United States: 1789 to 2009 4 (NBER, Working Paper 17443, Sept. 2011), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w17443.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9W3-QSA2]. 
89 See, e.g., CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS, REENGINEERING NONBANK SUPERVISION 5 (2019),  
https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/chaptertwo-overview_of_state_nonbank_supervision_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z453-2QR6] (“A principle of the U.S. federalist system is the preservation of state 
police powers to ensure the health, safety, and general public welfare of state citizens . . . .While 
financial services and regulation has evolved over the past 200 years, state authority to ensure state 
citizens are safe from predatory or unsafe practices has been a crucial tenet of the federalist financial 
regulatory system.”). 
90 See, e.g., Mehrsa Barandaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283, 1293 
(2014). 
91 Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38 (1980). 
92 See, e.g., Meta Brown & Sydnee Caldwell, Young Student Loan Borrowers Retreat from Housing and 
Auto Markets, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY STREET ECON. (Apr. 17, 2013), 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/04/young-student-loan-borrowers-retreat-from-
housing-and-auto-markets.html (illustrating the potential for lost asset accumulation opportunities, 
homeownership rates of 30-year-old student loan borrowers decreased by more than 5 percent compared 
with homeownership rates of 30-year-old non-borrowers); Chakrabarti, et. al., Press Briefing on 
Household Debt, with Focus on Student Debt, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 36–47 (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/press/pressbriefing-household-student-debt-
april32017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY3P-B2AR] (finding that college attendees with student debt have 
lower homeownership rates than college attendees without student debt and that higher debt balances are 
associated with lower home ownership rates). 
93 See, e.g., Jessica Dickler, Student Loan Debt Is a Hurdle for Many Would-Be Mothers, CNBC (May 
22, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/student-loan-debt-is-a-hurdle-for-many-would-be-
mothers.html. 
94 See, e.g., CFPB, SNAPSHOT OF OLDER CONSUMERS AND STUDENT LOAN DEBT 14 (2017), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_OA-Student-Loan-Snapshot.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J58D-4X9C] (reporting that borrowers nearing retirement “had a lower median amount 
in their employer-based retirement account or an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) than consumers 
without student loan debt”); Joseph Egoian, 73 Will Be the Retirement Norm for Millennials, 
NERDWALLET (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing/73-retirement-norm-
millennials [https://perma.cc/4D9Z-LU8A] (finding that a four-year college graduate with median 
student loan debt of $23,000 has about $115,000 less in retirement savings than a four-year college 
graduate with no student loans by the time they reach age 73). 
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to start businesses or serve their communities.95  The impact doesn’t end there — it 
ripples across neighborhoods, across communities, and across states.  There are few 
markets more consequential to the well-being of any state than the student loan 
market.  Research now shows the effects of student debt on communities and the 
economy–including stymying asset accumulation,96 driving income, racial, and 
gender inequality,97 and preventing residents from establishing long-term ties to their 
communities.98 
Policing abuses in the student loan market should be a core part of state 
governments’ approach to financial regulation for the same reason: when the student 
loan market fails, communities struggle.  Over the last half decade, states have met 
demands for state action head-on. State policymakers have done more to protect 
                                                                                                     
95 See, e.g., Brent W. Ambrose, et. al., The Impact of Student Loan Debt on Small Business Formation, 
(FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 15-26, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417676 [https://perma.cc/V5Q4-YTQ7]; Brandon 
Busteed, Student Loan Debt: Major Barrier to Entrepreneurship, GALLUP (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/186179/student-loan-debt-major-barrierentrepreneurship.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6GSF-F3S4]. 
96 See, e.g., Brown & Caldwell, supra note 89. See generally William Elliott & Melinda Lewis, Student 
Debt Effects on Financial Well-Being: Research and Policy Implications, 29 J. ECON. SURVS. 614, 614 
(Aug. 8, 2015), [https://perma.cc/BNY2-4T54] (finding that student loan debt can delay asset 
accumulation for years and can decrease a family’s net worth by 63 percent). 
97 See, e.g., Richard Fry, Young Adults, Student Debt, and Economic Well-Being, PEW RES. CTR. (May 
14, 2014), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2014/05/ST_2014.05.14_student-debt_complete-report.pdf (“[H]ouseholds 
headed by a young, college-educated adult without any student debt obligations have about seven times 
the typical net worth ($64,700) of households headed by a young, college-educated adult with student 
debt ($8,700).”).  Additional research shows that an average student debt load ($53,000) for a dual-
headed household with bachelors’ degrees from four-year universities leads to a lifetime wealth loss of 
nearly $208,000. Robert Hiltonsmith, At What Cost?: How Student Debt Reduces Lifetime Wealth, 
DĒMOS (Aug. 2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/imce/AtWhatCostFinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/429S-52BV]; see also Daniel Cooper & J. Christina Wang, Student Loan Debt and 
Economic Outcomes, FED. RES. BANK OF BOS., no. 14-7, 2014, at 22, https://www.bostonfed.org/-
/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/economic/cpp1407.pdf.  Furthermore, women and borrowers of 
color are disproportionately affected by student debt. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 31 
(showing that on average, women have higher student loan balances than men); see also Canchola & 
Frotman, supra note 33 (noting that student loan borrowers of color are more likely to attend for-profit 
colleges and face unique obstacles while completing a degree, that data shows that over 90% of African-
American and 72% of Latino students leave college with student loan debt, compared to 66% of white 
students and 51% of Asian-American students, and that upon entering repayment, research suggests 
higher rates of student loan defaults and delinquencies in zip codes populated primarily by minorities 
with higher income levels and education); Emily Rauscher & William Elliott, The Relationship Between 
Income and Net Worth: A Virtuous Cycle for High – but Not Low – Income Households, 20 J. POVERTY, 
Jan. 2016, at 1 (finding that a college graduate with heavy student loans will achieve the nation’s 
median net worth slower than a college graduate without that debt, and concluding that financing higher 
education through student loans can put college graduates who begin school with few assets even further 
behind their wealthier peers). 
98 See Alvarro Mezza et al., Can Student Loan Debt Explain Low Homeownership Rates for Young 
Adults?, 1 FED. RES. CONSUMER & CMTY. CONTEXT 2, 5 (2019); PJ Tabit & Josh Winters, “Rural Brain 
Drain”: Examining Millennial Migration Patterns and Student Loan Debt, 1 FED. RES. CONSUMER & 
CMTY. CONTEXT 7, 7 (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/consumer-community-
context-201901.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAM5-E58B]. 
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student loan borrowers in the past five years than in the fifty years prior.  Since 2015, 
ten states have passed laws updating their banking regulators’ supervisory and 
licensing authority to include student loan servicers, providing a key building block 
to engage in regular oversight and take early action to identify and halt illegal 
practices that plague the student loan industry.99  In that same five year period, state 
law enforcement agencies filed more than half a dozen lawsuits against the largest 
student loan servicers in the country.100 In parallel, regulators utilized their 
supervisory authorities to highlight and stamp out illegal activities.101  Beyond 
individual lawsuits against the largest companies in the student loan market, 
                                                                                                     
99 For a comprehensive list of the state legislation, see supra note 14.  
100 See, e.g., Press Release, Xavier Becerra, Cal. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Becerra Charges Navient 
Corporation, Largest Student Loan Servicer, with Deceitful Practices and Debt-Collection Misconduct 
in Lawsuit (June 28, 2018), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-charges-
navient-corporation-largest-student-loan [https://perma.cc/9RPS-VCTF]; Press Release, Bob Ferguson, 
Wash. Att’y Gen., AG Ferguson Files Suit Against Sallie Mae Offshoot Navient Corp., Announces 
Student Loan Bill of Rights Legislation (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-
ferguson-files-suit-against-sallie-mae-offshoot-navient-corp-announces-student 
[https://perma.cc/3M2U-96K7]; Press Release, Maura Healey, Mass. Att’y Gen., AG Healey Secures 
$2.4 Million, Significant Policy Reforms in Major Settlement with Student Loan Servicer (Nov. 22, 
2016), https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-secures-24-million-significant-policy-reforms-in-major-
settlement-with-student-loan [https://perma.cc/CCL9-EM89]; Press Release, Maura Healey, Mass. Att’y 
Gen., AG Healey Sues to Protect Public Service Loan Forgiveness (Aug. 23, 2017),  
https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-sues-to-protect-public-service-loan-forgiveness 
[https://perma.cc/9SM7-VDPV]; Press Release, Jim Hood, Miss. Att’y Gen., AG Hood Launches 
Lawsuit Against Student Loan Lenders (July 24, 2018), http://www.agjimhood.com/releases/ag-hood-
launches-lawsuit-against-student-loan-lenders/ [https://perma.cc/H782-VUCT]; Press Release, Letitia 
James, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James and Superintendent Vulla Announce $9 Million 
Settlement of Federal Student Loan Servicing Claims with Acs Education Services (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-and-superintendent-vullo-announce-9-
million-settlement [https://perma.cc/2YE5-UUNW]; Letitia James, N.Y. Att’y Gen., AG James Sues 
Student Loan Servicer for Mismanaging Loan Forgiveness Program (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/ag-james-sues-student-loan-servicer-mismanaging-loan-
forgiveness-program [https://perma.cc/98US-TZWH]; Press Release, Lisa Madigan, Ill. Att’y Gen., 
Attorney General Madigan Sues Navient and Sallie Mae for Rampant Student Loan Abuses (Jan. 18, 
2017), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2017_01/20170118.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y4FB-CZVF]; Press Release, Josh Shapiro, Pa. Att’y Gen., Case Update: Attorney 
General Shapiro Announces Another Win in Lawsuit Against Nation’s Largest Student Loan Company 
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/updates/case-update-attorney-general-
shapiro-announces-another-win-in-lawsuit-against-nations-largest-student-loan-company/18 
[https://perma.cc/6JL8-GKLM]. 
101 See, e.g., Consent Order, In re TFC Credit Corp. of Cal. (NMLS #1708442, Banking Comm’nr, 
Hartford, CT, May 28, 2019); Consent Order, In re Tuition Options & EDVANTAGE (N.Y.S. Dept. of 
Fin. Servs., Aug. 14, 2019); see also, Press Release, Letitia James, supra note 100; Press Release, Linda 
A. Lacewell, Fin. Servs. Superintendent, N.Y. Dept. of Fin. Servs. DFS Superintendent Linda A. 
Lacewell Announces Settlement with National Student Loan Servicer of For-Profit Schools (Aug. 15, 
2019),  https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1908151 
[https://perma.cc/AMU9-NRX6]; Minnesota Commerce Department announces action against improper 
student loan debt collections, supra note 38 (“Minnesota Commerce [Department] . . . and regulators in 
four other states have reached a $500,000 joint settlement with two subsidiaries of iQor Holdings Inc. 
for improper debt collection practices, including making abusive and harassing phone calls to increase 
student loan payments.”). 
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Attorneys General have taken other high-profile enforcement actions, including 
actions against the corporations that operate predatory for-profit colleges, wiping out 
hundreds of millions of dollars in student loan debt.102  
On the heels of significant reforms to protect student loan borrowers, some state 
lawmakers have begun to propose more sweeping and comprehensive authorities to 
reshape the tools that states can bring to bear when working to protect borrowers.  
For example, California lawmakers have proposed ambitious legislation to replicate 
many of the Bureau’s critical tools: including state-level market monitoring 
provisions, the nation’s first comprehensive state-level student loan servicing 
standards, and a student borrower advocate modeled on the CFPB student loan 
ombudsman.103  New Jersey legislators have proposed sweeping new reforms to the 
private student loan market, providing enhanced protections that prohibit predatory 
practices across the lifecycle of a private loan, from origination through 
collections.104  Maryland legislators, with the support of Maryland’s Attorney 
General, have introduced legislation that would create new protections to crack down 
on abusive student loan debt collection practices that mirror the worst of the “robo-
signing” scandals of the foreclosure crisis.105  
But even as these proposals represent a critical step forward in expanding states’ 
ability to police the student finance market, they also expose the limitations of the 
state regulatory system that they seek to strengthen–relying on state agencies that are 
far different than the Consumer Bureau established by Congress.  
The limitations of the system are most clearly evident where borrowers are left 
without critical protections as new risks emerge.  Legislators and regulators may 
struggle to navigate slow-moving statehouses to seek out new authorities or tools to 
address these risks, even where, in some instances, they already have supervisory 
jurisdiction under existing laws.106  For example, consider a state legislature that 
authorizes its banking agency to oversee student loan companies, only to later 
determine that the agency could better police the student loan market with expanded 
                                                                                                     
102 See, e.g., Jillian Berman, Former For-Profit College Students Will Have $168 Million in Student 
Debt Cancelled, MARKETWATCH (June 17, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/former-for-
profit-college-students-will-have-168-million-in-student-debt-cancelled-2019-06-14 
[https://perma.cc/C569-EEBW]; Ian Stewart, Nearly 180,000 Students Won’t Have to Repay Loans from 
For-Profit Higher Ed Company, NPR (Jan. 3, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/03/682057881/nearly-180-000-students-wont-have-to-repay-loans-from-
for-profit-higher-ed-compa [https://perma.cc/8C2H-UHYF]; Press Release, Ellen Rosenblum, supra 
note 40. 
103 See, e.g., Felicia Mello, As Trump Rolls Back Student Loan Protections, an Obama-Era Watchdog 
Brings the Fight to California, CALMATTERS (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://calmatters.org/politics/2019/04/student-loans-debt-for-profit-college-trump-obama-california/ 
[https://perma.cc/7A8N-9FG8]. 
104 S. 2359, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020). 
105 H.B. 1562, 2020 Leg., 441st Sess. (Md. 2020); see also Student Borrower Prot. Ctr., The Long 
Legacy of Predatory Private Student Loans: Defrauding Borrowers and Lying to Courts 7 (2020) 
(documenting private student loan debt collection practices in Maryland). 
106 See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text. 
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regulatory and data collection authority.107  This process can take years and only 
succeeds if legislators and advocates can overcome partisan and industry 
opposition.108  
The limitations of the system can also be seen in the siloed nature of recent 
legislative reforms built upon a system focused on narrow classes of products or 
providers.  To date, advocacy efforts to better protect student loan borrowers have 
focused on enacting new legislation to provide state financial regulators with 
enhanced authorities over “student loan servicers.”109  This reform is both necessary 
and valuable, but clearly limited in scope—protecting borrowers from just one set of 
potential bad acts or practices that occur after they incur debt, but before the moment 
in which they might default.  
As a consequence, in many states, even after these advocacy efforts are 
successful and new laws are passed, the state regulator will still lack authority over 
the companies responsible for handling that same borrower’s account should the 
borrower default on his or her loans.110  Oversight over nonbanks is typically 
authorized through a patchwork of narrow laws, and, in the student loan market, it is 
common that oversight over the collection of defaulted loans by third-party debt 
collectors is excluded from the scope of student loan oversight statutes.111 
Consider, for example, the problem posed by illegal collection tactics.  Where a 
state regulator oversees student loan servicers but lacks comparable authority over 
debt collectors, a bright line delineates the limits of states’ oversight authority.  As a 
result, despite ample evidence of rampant harm and illegal practices inflicted by debt 
collectors upon the most vulnerable borrowers,112 and despite in some instances the 
                                                                                                     
107 See, e.g., David Lazarus, California Braces for Battle with Trump Administration Over Student 
Loans, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-california-
devos-student-loans-20180306-story.html [https://perma.cc/A5PV-E39H] (“‘California led the country 
in enacting a licensing program for private contractors that service federal student loans,’ [California 
Attorney General Xavier Becerra] told me. ‘We are proud of this important program and of our strong 
student protections in general, but we also know we have a long way to go.’ [He] said nearly a third of 
California student-loan borrowers are in default or delinquent in payments, which he called ‘a clear 
indication of servicing failure.’”). 
108 See Kevin Wack, Student Borrow Protection Bill Stalls in California, AM. BANKER, 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/student-borrower-protection-bill-stalls-in-california 
[https://perma.cc/5UEQ-7DZS] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020). See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text. 
109 See, e.g., Andrew Kreighbaum, States Put Stamp on Student Loan Oversight, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(July 19, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/19/states-pass-flurry-bills-targeting-
loan-servicers [https://perma.cc/LH2R-ZCZM]. 
110 See If You Default on Your Federal Student Loan, the Loan May Be Placed with a Collection 
Agency, Which Will Then Contact You to Obtain Payment, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/default/collections [https://perma.cc/PN5W-3NGK ] (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2020). 
111 See, e.g., Cal. Fin. Code § 28104 (West 2019) (“A ‘student loan servicer’ does not include a debt 
collector, as defined in Section 1788.2 of the Civil Code, whose student loan debt collection business, 
and business operations, involve collecting, or attempting to collect, on defaulted student loans, that is, 
federal student loans for which no payment has been received for 270 days or more, or private student 
loans, in default, according to the terms of the loan documents.”). 
112 See, e.g., Attorney General Madigan Sues Navient and Sallie Mae for Rampant Student Loan Abuses, 
ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (Jan. 18, 2017), 
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debt collector being a subsidiary of the same corporate entity as the original servicer, 
state regulators must turn a blind eye to the risks facing student loan borrowers.113 
California and New York each illustrate this gap well.  After protracted legislative 
efforts to pass student loan servicing legislation in 2016 in California and in 2019 in 
New York, borrowers in default still fall outside of the purview of state regulators, 
forcing lawmakers to begin anew as they aspire to cover the waterfront. These delays 
will add years before diligent oversight is established over the full lifecycle of a 
student loan.114 
These regulatory blind spots with regard to debt collectors are just one example.  
Even within the student loan market, where a significant expansion of authority has 
occurred at the state level over the course of the past five years, states are often left 
without the tools necessary to demand justice when, for example, borrowers fall 
victim to abuses by student lenders, specialty student finance companies, credit 
reporting agencies, and companies promising “debt relief” and “credit repair” to 
borrowers in distress.  Limitations in the system are also seen in oversight of other 
student financial products that seemingly fall just beyond the reach of state 
regulators.  Whether due to the loopholes enshrined in legislation or a slick sales 
                                                                                                     
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2017_01/20170118.html [https://perma.cc/34YD-
6WE8] (“Attorney General Lisa Madigan today filed a lawsuit against Navient Corporation, its 
subsidiaries Navient Solutions Inc., Pioneer Credit Recovery Inc. and General Revenue Corporation and 
Sallie Mae Bank, over widespread abuses across all aspects of its business, including student lending, 
student loan servicing and student loan debt collection.”); U.S. Department of Education to End 
Contracts with Several Private Collection Agencies, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Feb. 27, 2015), 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-end-contracts-several-private-
collection-agencies [https://perma.cc/V25Y-DTL4 ] (“In its review, the Department found that agents of 
the companies made materially inaccurate representations to borrowers about the loan rehabilitation 
program, which is an option that can create benefits to defaulted borrowers after they have made nine 
on-time payments in a period of 10 months.  The five private collection agencies listed above were 
found to have given inaccurate information at unacceptably high rates about these benefits. In particular, 
these agencies gave borrowers misleading information about the benefits to the borrowers' credit report 
and about the waiver of certain collection fees.”); see also DEANNE LOONIN & PERSIS YU, POUNDING 
STUDENT LOAN BORROWERS, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 4 (2014), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-
reports/report-sl-debt-collectors.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7J5-6KT2]. 
113 See, e.g., CFPB Sues Nation's Largest Student Loan Company Navient for Failing Borrowers at 
Every Stage of Repayment, CFPB (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largest-student-loan-company-navient-failing-borrowers-every-stage-
repayment/ [https://perma.cc/DAP6-689Z ] (“The Bureau also alleges that Navient, through its 
subsidiary Pioneer, made illegal misrepresentations relating to the federal loan rehabilitation program 
available to defaulted borrowers.  Pioneer misrepresented the effect of completing the federal loan 
rehabilitation program by falsely stating or implying that doing so would remove all adverse information 
about the defaulted loan from the borrower’s credit report.  Pioneer also misrepresented the collection 
fees that would be forgiven upon completion of the program.”) (emphasis added). 
114 See, e.g., Kate Berry, In Rebuke of CFPB States Look to Get Tough on Debt Collectors, AM. BANKER 
(Jan. 15, 2020)  [https://perma.cc/N78B-98KD]; 
 David Lazarus, Trump Slashed Consumer Protections Slashed Consumer Protections California Is 
Stepping Up, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2020), [https://perma.cc/MNG7-7RWS] (“Significantly, the new law 
also would give the state oversight of debt collectors—a regulatory function now limited to federal 
authorities.”); NY Governor Wants to License Debt Collectors, NBC (Dec. 19, 2019),  
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/politics/ny-governor-wants-to-license-debt-collectors/2245611/ 
[https://perma.cc/NWP5-9UTN]. 
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pitch from an “innovative” business that claims its products fall outside the scope of 
existing protections, these practices leave borrowers without the benefit of a state 
regulator working to halt abuses and protect its citizens.115   
For example, some states have chosen to carve out a special type of student loan 
servicer from otherwise comprehensive oversight proposals.116  These carve-outs 
remain controversial, as these firms continue to be accused of engaging in aggressive 
“steering” practices and have frequently been the target of criticism by government 
watchdogs.117  In other states, companies make high cost, risky loans to vulnerable 
students at predatory schools, but avoid basic transparency obligations because they 
fall just outside the requirements for licensure.118  Similarly, a wave of “financial 
innovation” in student finance has unleashed exotic new financial products, known 
as “income-share agreements,” that purport to be neither “credit” nor “debt,” despite 
mirroring the structure of a private student loan in nearly all respects.119  By 
extension, the backers of these products and the law firms paid to advise them have 
adopted the posture that because these financial products are neither debt nor credit, 
the firms that offer these products need not be bound by the state laws and oversight 
that regulate debt and credit.120   
                                                                                                     
115 Consider, for example, the emergence of “income-share agreements” as an alternative financing 
scheme for students seeking to pay for college. Attorneys hired by providers of these financial products 
have argued that they sit beyond the reach of regulators who otherwise oversee consumer lending.  
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, REGULATORY TREATMENT OF EDUCATIONAL ISAS UNDER FEDERAL AND 
SELECT STATE CONSUMER CREDIT STATUTES 17 (2019), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/190408-
regulatory-educational-consumer-credit-statutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S4U-KEVG] (“Accordingly, we 
believe that a court should conclude that an ISA is not subject to the New York usury cap because an 
ISA is not a “loan” for purposes of the New York usury law.”). 
116 See, e.g., AB-38, Cal. Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2018) (“This division shall not apply to any of the 
following . . . (6) In connection with its responsibilities as a guaranty agency engaged in default 
aversion, a state or nonprofit private institution or organization having an agreement with the United 
States Secretary of Education under Section 428(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. Sec. 
1078(b).”). 
117 See Mike Pierce, What It Means To Be A Student Loan Servicer: Guaranty Agency Edition, STUDENT 
BORROWER PROTECTION CTR. (March 29, 2019), https://protectborrowers.org/what-it-means-to-be-a-
student-loan-servicer-guaranty-agency-edition/ [https://perma.cc/Z288-H633]; Federal Student Loans: 
Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Schools’ Default Rates, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 
(April 26, 2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-163 [https://perma.cc/6378-TBZS]. 
118 See, e.g., Press Release, Linda A. Lacewell, supra note 101 (noting that the New York Department of 
Financial Services could not take action to halt the unlicensed extension of high cost loans because the 
lender did not fall within its parameters and only gained jurisdiction when the entity took on retail 
installment obligations). 
119 See Mitch Daniels, Here Is a Powerful Alternative to Student Loans, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2019),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/income-share-agreements-are-a-powerful-alternative-to-
student-loans/2019/11/27/5290d0ee-0be3-11ea-97ac-a7ccc8dd1ebc_story.html [https://perma.cc/K6DQ-
R49P ] (“An ISA is dramatically more student-friendly than a loan. . . . Think of an ISA as equity 
instead of debt, or as working one’s way through college — after college.”). But see Adam Levitin, 
What Is “Credit”? AfterPay, Earnin’, and ISAs, CREDIT SLIPS (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/07/what-is-credit-afterpay-earnin-and-isas.html 
[https://perma.cc/JM6K-JNBT] (“[T]here's good reason to think that some, if not all, ISAs involve a 
debt and are therefore ‘credit,’ for various federal regulatory purposes.  The most natural read of the 
statutes is that ISAs are credit and subject to the full panoply of federal consumer finance regulations.”). 
120 See, e.g., MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, supra note 115.   
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As each of these preceding examples illustrates in isolation, borrowers are 
exposed to harm when gaps in the system sideline state regulators.  When taken 
together, these examples depict a system that lacks the dexterity to regulate the 
modern student finance landscape. At every step, predatory actors seek to exploit a 
vulnerable system that is often too slow or too fragmented to take the necessary 
action to protect borrowers. 
While the recent history of law and regulation in student finance discussed above 
clearly demonstrates the challenges facing tens of millions of student borrowers, it 
also exposes the flaws in the state-level regulatory framework across the marketplace 
at large.  For example, similar to a private student financing firm that purportedly 
does not make “private education loans” as defined in federal consumer financial 
law, payday lenders market themselves as “mortgage loans”121 or “open end lines of 
credit”122 to skirt the protections of usury laws.123  Similarly, “technology” 
companies tout that payday loan products are not “credit” and therefore usury limits 
do not apply.124  Past industry efforts to skirt accountability are more than just a 
function of regulatory arbitrage.  Much as states lack authority to perform routine 
oversight over student loan debt collectors, there are still states that cannot oversee 
mortgage servicers for compliance with basic consumer laws even a decade after a 
                                                                                                     
121 See, e.g., Debbie Holmes, Changes in Ohio Short-Term Lending Law Create New Loan Landscape, 
CINCINNATI PUB. RADIO (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.wvxu.org/post/changes-ohio-short-term-lending-
law-create-new-loan-landscape#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/VM8W-MHBC ] (“In 2008, Ohio voters 
approved a 28% interest rate cap on short-term loans.  However, payday lenders used a loophole and 
applied for licenses under the Mortgage Lending Act.  That allowed them to charge higher interest 
rates and add more fees.  Some annual percentage rates could reach 600% or higher.”). 
122 See, e.g., Michael Lee Pope, Virginia Lawmakers Play Whack-A-Mole with Predatory Lenders, THE 
CONNECTION (Feb. 7, 2020), http://www.connectionnewspapers.com/news/2018/feb/09/virginia-
lawmakers-play-whack-mole-predatory-lende/ [https://perma.cc/WM4D-JX6R]; Editorial: Virginia 
Needs to Rein in Payday Lenders, VA. PILOT (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.pilotonline.com/opinion/article_5155281a-19b8-11e9-92a9-e391dde9be3b.html 
[https://perma.cc/7HTX-KR56] (“A loophole in Virginia’s usury law allows ‘open’ credit lines that are 
exempt from interest rate caps.  The law was intended to let stores offer charge cards . . . .  Now loan 
companies use open-end ‘lines of credit’ to entice people who are down on their luck to run up big, 
seemingly never-ending debts.  Another variation uses the borrower’s car title as security, while in 
another, the borrower agrees to automatic withdrawals from a bank account, sometimes without 
understanding how often the withdrawal will be made.”).  
123 See generally Jeff Guo, Many States Have Cracked Down on Payday Loans. Here’s How Lenders 
Still Get Away with It, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/09/many-states-have-cracked-down-on-
payday-loans-heres-how-lenders-still-get-away-with-it/ [https://perma.cc/KY5M-QJAG]; Astra Taylor, 
Why It’s So Hard to Regulate Payday Lenders, NEW YORKER (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-its-so-hard-to-regulate-payday-lenders 
[https://perma.cc/S9PH-AKKY]. 
124 See, e.g., Kevin Dugan, Popular Cash Advance App Earnin Operating in Payday Loan ‘Gray Area,’ 
Critics Claim, N.Y. POST (March 21, 2019),  https://nypost.com/2019/03/21/popular-cash-advance-app-
earnin-operating-in-payday-loan-gray-area-critics-claim/ [https://perma.cc/L696-WLNG] (“Critics say 
Earnin’s marketing and business models resemble those of Payday 2.0, and that its tactics may be 
intended to skirt regulations on payday lending, which has been banned in 15 states including New York 
because of sky-high interest rates that can top 500 percent on an annualized basis.”). 
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once-in-a-century financial crisis driven by abuses across this sector.125  Exposure to 
risks driven by “innovators” extends beyond traditional lending and servicing, as the 
challenges presented by bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have demonstrated over 
the past decade.126  At the periphery of the financial system, we see our most 
vulnerable citizens exploited by industries that prey on those seeking the American 
Dream, stripping wealth from families by promising a way to “rent-to-own” that 
proves illusory for nearly all who pursue it.127  Yet again in this case, we see the 
purveyors of these exotic products exploit gaps in the state regulatory system to avoid 
basic consumer financial protection and oversight, stretching back decades.128 
In each of the preceding examples, American families face significant risks 
where financial services firms exploit gaps in the state financial regulatory system.  
Time and time again, as markets have changed, as the political and legal landscapes 
have shifted, and as crises have arisen, borrowers have been left behind.  A product 
falls into a regulatory blind spot. A loan that was illegal yesterday can now be 
extended at triple digit interest rates. A new product gains a foothold in the market 
without any guardrails or protections. A regulator knows a product is hurting 
borrowers, but does not have the tools to help. The end result is the same – a borrower 
gets ripped off, a family falls behind, a neighborhood is decimated.  
This paper is not intended to be an indictment of the dedicated officials at the 
helm of state regulatory agencies.  The system is not vulnerable because of a lack of 
commitment or a lack of seriousness of purpose by the dedicated public servants 
tasked with protecting American families. Instead, faults lie in the structure of the 
patchwork system itself—a system that fails to give regulators the tools and authority 
necessary to ensure “[s]ound financial institutions and honest financial practices,” 
despite a mandate to do so.129  With each new crisis, this system falls further short of 
its intent, in the process failing American families and putting the health of the 
                                                                                                     
125 See New Jersey Enacts a Law to License Mortgage Loan Officers, MAYER BROWN (May 8, 2019),  
https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectives-events/publications/2019/05/new-jersey-
enacts-a-law-to-licensing-mortgage-loan-servicers.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6JU-GRX8 ] (“Nationwide, 
less than 12 states do not license those who service residential mortgage loans for others.”). 
126 See, e.g., Money Transmitter Act Guidance for Virtual Currency Businesses, PA. DEP’T OF BANKING 
AND SECURITIES, 
https://www.dobs.pa.gov/Documents/Securities%20Resources/MTA%20Guidance%20for%20Virtual%
20Currency%20Businesses.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6F5-93AH ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (noting that 
virtual currency exchanges are not covered under Pennsylvania’s Money Transmitter Act). But see 
Nancy Scola, Consumer Bureau Now Taking—and Expecting—Bitcoin Complaints, WASH. POST (Aug. 
11, 2014),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/08/11/consumer-bureau-now-
taking-and-expecting-bitcoin-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/F3J3-AZ64]. 
127 See James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 751, 781 (1981). 
128 See, e.g., Brian Highsmith & Margot Saunders, The Rent-to-Own Racket, Using Criminal Courts to 
Coerce Payments from Vulnerable Families, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 6 (Feb. 2019)  
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/report-rent-to-own-racket.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3MGA-696Z ] (“The industry has been able to charge astronomic effective interest 
rates by structuring the consumer contracts to avoid the application of state laws limiting finance 
charges in consumer credit sales.”). 
129 Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 
Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, on Problems, Options, and Issues Currently Facing the Financial 
Services Industry and the Agencies that Regulate and Supervise These Entities, at 69 (1983). 
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economy in jeopardy.130 
IV. THE STATE CONSUMER BUREAU: A VISION FOR A FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
SYSTEM THAT CENTERS CONSUMERS 
We are not bound to accept the status quo or pursue incremental improvements 
to the current structure of state oversight.  The rationale necessitating the creation of 
the CFPB at the federal level and the systemic reforms and institutional structure that 
led to its widespread success offers a different vision–one that can meet and conquer 
the challenges consumers face and can recognize the importance that credit plays in 
the lives of borrowers in each and every state.  
States should establish dedicated consumer financial protection regulators– 
“state consumer bureaus.”  This vision recognizes the critical role states play in 
overseeing the financial markets in the 21st century and builds as its foundation an 
independent, well-resourced state regulator, with broad authority, robust tools that 
allow deliberate interventions to address consumer harm, and a focus that centers 
consumers in every aspect of its design and structure.  
This vision has gained momentum in state capitals since 2017 as New York,131 
Pennsylvania,132  and Maryland133 have all made significant efforts to bolster state-
level consumer financial protection.  In 2020, the California legislature will consider 
the furthest-reaching proposal introduced to-date, overhauling its existing state 
financial regulator to mirror the structure and reach of the federal Consumer 
Bureau.134  
As these states and others undertake this critical task, it is important to draw the 
right insights from the Bureau’s successes to ensure that lawmakers shape these 
                                                                                                     
130 Id. 
131 See, e.g., Press Release, NY Dept. of Fin. Servs, Acting Superintendent Lacewell Announces 
Appointment of Katherine Lemire as Executive Deputy Superintendent of Newly Created Consumer 
Protection & Enforcement Division SERVS.(Apr. 29, 2019),  
https://dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1904291 [https://perma.cc/K9ZX-3XP7]. 
132 See, e.g., Press Release, PA Office of Attorney General, Attorney General Josh Shapiro Announces 
Consumer Financial Protection Unit (July 20, 2017), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-
action/press-releases/attorney-general-josh-shapiro-announces-consumer-financial-protection-unit/ 
[https://perma.cc/36PE-M624]. 
133 See, e.g., Michael Dresser, Assembly Leaders Want Maryland to Protect Consumers if U.S. Backs 
Down, BALT. SUN (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-financial-protections-
20180126-story.html [https://perma.cc/A7X8-BLFB].  
134 See, e.g., David Lazarus, Column: Trump Slashed Consumer Protections. So California Is Stepping 
Up, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-01-09/column-california-
consumer-bureau [https://perma.cc/8RSE-CL6T]; Aarthi Swaminathan, ‘A Major, Major Initiative’: 
California Wants to Create its own Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, YAHOO FINANCE, Feb. 10, 
2020, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/california-mini-cfpb-133209881.html [https://perma.cc/E6CZ-
UHPC]; Michael McCauley, Consumer Reports Praises Governor Newsom’s Plan to Create Consumer 
Financial Watchdog for California, CONSUMER REPORTS,  (Jan. 20, 2020), 
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/consumer-reports-praises-governor-newsoms-plan-
to-create-consumer-financial-watchdog-for-california/ [https://perma.cc/V6NX-SBDG]; Aarthi 
Swaminathan, ‘A Major, Major Initiative’: California Wants to Create Its Own Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, YAHOO FIN. (Feb. 10, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/california-mini-cfpb-
133209881.html.  
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efforts in a manner that best allows state governments to deliver.  These insights are 
described below. 
A. All state consumer financial protection laws should be consolidated at a 
single agency.   
One of the most powerful reforms of the Dodd-Frank Act was the decision to 
consolidate the administration of the most essential federal consumer financial 
protection laws at a single agency.135  From the Truth in Lending Act to the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, the CFPB administers a wide range of laws to ensure that consumers 
are protected.136  Congress also bestowed upon the CFPB broad authority to stamp 
out unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices by any covered person under its purview, 
in any market for consumer financial products or services.137  With respect to each 
of these laws, the CFPB has rulemaking and supervisory authority.138 The CFPB also 
shares enforcement authority with state attorneys general, state banking departments 
and, in some cases, other federal regulators.139  
State consumer bureaus should enjoy the same range of authorities in order to 
ensure these new agencies are well-positioned to take a similar, holistic approach to 
regulating the consumer finance marketplace as their federal counterpart.  Further, 
authorizing legislation for a state consumer bureau should explicitly incorporate 
these federal consumer financial protection statutes, declaring that any violation of 
any law under CFPB’s purview is also a violation of state law, enforceable by the 
new agency. 
But a state consumer bureau can and should go further than its federal 
counterpart. State lawmakers can recognize additional protections that were not 
incorporated among the enumerated statutes under Dodd-Frank, but which are still 
essential to protecting consumers.  For example, both the Military Lending Act and 
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act provide key consumer financial protections to 
                                                                                                     
135 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 344 (2013) (discussing the Bureau’s “enumerated statutes”). 
136 See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12)(q) (2012); Christopher Lewis Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TULANE L. REV. 1057, 1068 (2016) (“The CFPA 
transferred regulatory authority for ‘consumer financial law’ to the CFPB; it defined ‘consumer 
financial law’ to include the CFPA itself along with eighteen ‘enumerated’ consumer laws, including 
nearly all consumer credit and bank-account-related consumer protection statutes.”). 
137 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (2019); see, e.g., Peterson, supra note 136, at 1061.  
138 It is important to note, however, there are some divergences across the scope of the Bureau's different 
powers. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 135, at 343 (“The CFPB has rulemaking, supervision, and 
enforcement authority over an extremely broad swath of the consumer financial services industry, but 
the extent of its rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement powers do not all align.”). 
139 Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5522 (2018); see also LAUREN SAUNDERS, ROLES OF THE STATES 
UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 1-2 (Dec. 
2010) (describing the “partnership” that the Dodd Frank Act creates with the states, including the role of 
state attorneys general and state banking regulators in enforcing aspects of the law); see generally Mark 
Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA 
L. REV. 115 (2013) (discussing the array of federal regulators with jurisdiction over the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act).  
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military families, and the state should supervise covered entities for compliance with 
these critical laws.140  State consumer bureaus should also have the authority to 
protect consumers from being harassed on their cell phones, as well as from being 
harmed by predatory small business loans.141 
Most importantly, state consumer bureaus can stand up when the federal 
government fails.  Borrowers should not be subjected to discrimination in the credit 
market simply because the ideologies of federal policymakers’ shift.142  States can, 
and should, ensure that their statutes–from state fair lending to state consumer 
protection laws–are stronger. For example, statutes should explicitly contain the 
critical mechanisms needed to hold companies accountable when they cause 
disparate harm to vulnerable communities.143  Furthermore, replicating the state 
enforcement that exists in Dodd-Frank, lawmakers should create mechanisms, where 
appropriate, to allow municipalities and private individuals to enforce key 
protections and regulations promulgated by the state consumer bureaus and allow 
them to become an equal partner in protecting consumers.144  
B. Regulators need access to a full toolbox to fix a broken consumer finance 
market.  
From handling individual consumer complaints to performing regular 
supervision, from enforcement to rulemaking, creating an effective consumer bureau 
requires that a new agency have the full panoply of tools to hold bad actors 
accountable for illegal conduct.145  The central premise behind the CFPB was not 
only the recognition that consumer financial protection belongs at a single 
government agency, but that such an agency must be able to bring the full range of 
                                                                                                     
140 See Military Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266-69 (2006) (codified 
as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2018)); Servicemember Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4043 
(2018). 
141 See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018); see, e.g., Ann Marie Wiersch & Christine Weiss, Protecting Small-
Business Borrowers, FOREFRONT (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-
events/publications/forefront/ff-v6n03/ff-20151207-v6n03-protecting-small-business-borrowers.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/J32H-ZB8L]. 
142 See, e.g., Christopher Willis, CFPB Hints at Possible Disparate Impact Rulemaking in Fall Agenda, 
JDSUPRA (Oct. 29, 2018),  https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfpb-hints-at-possible-disparate-impact-
29309/ [https://perma.cc/446Z-J834]; Letter from Attorney Gen. Josh Stein et al. to Acting Director 
Mick Mulvaney (Sept. 5, 2018),  
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/ecoa_disparate_impact_letter_to_cfpb_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L5GC-FDHG]. 
143 See, e.g., Richard Loconte, DFS Takes Action to Protect New Yorkers from Unfair Auto Lending 
Practices as Federal Government Rolls Back Consumer Protection, DEP’T FIN. SERVS. (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1808231 [https://perma.cc/TA63-
UPAF]. 
144 12 U.S.C. § 5552; see, e.g., Totten, supra note 139; Kathleen C. Engel, Local Government and Risky 
Home Loans, 69 SMU L. REV. 609, 637 (2016). 
145 See, e.g., Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy, & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 
1146 (2012) (“Congress gave the CFPB six basic tools to achieve these goals: examination and 
supervision, enforcement, rulemaking, consumer education, collecting and responding to consumer 
complaints, and researching and monitoring consumer financial markets.”). 
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legal, regulatory, and policy tools to bear to help consumers.  Underpinning this 
insight was the recognition that this broad, complementary set of tools gives a 
consumer bureau the capacity to select the most effective and efficient means to 
protect consumers, and that this approach was the best way to prevent another crisis.  
Congress also gave the CFPB wide-ranging authority to write rules to ban 
specific unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices wherever they occur, as 
long as the company committing predatory acts falls under the agency's purview.146  
In effect, this gives the agency the ability to take what it learns from supervision, 
consumer complaints,  research, and enforcement in order to apply these insights to 
set stronger standards for an entire industry, rather than simply halt the most 
egregious practices at an individual company.  
By following this approach, state lawmakers can authorize a state consumer 
bureau to be nimble, allowing each of its tools to work in concert to effectively 
regulate an entire industry or market. Parallel, or even overlapping, mechanisms of 
accountability should not be dismissed as duplicative or superfluous. Instead, they 
should be considered critically important to the effective protection of consumers.  
C. Agencies’ jurisdiction should be broad enough to cover the entirety of the 
consumer financial services marketplace, without artificial limits based on 
what a product is called or whether a financial institution takes deposits.  
One of the most significant lessons of the crisis was that all financial services 
firms, regardless of structure, need robust and comprehensive oversight if we wish 
to counter consumer harm that permeates the banking and financial sector.147  That 
lesson is as true now as it was then.  We have seen how banks like Wells Fargo can 
rip millions of people off without them ever knowing.148  But we have also seen how 
nonbank financial service providers can harm people to the tune of billions of 
dollars.149  
The structure of the CFPB was unique in that it recognized that consumers’ 
financial lives do not fit neatly into categories like “bank” and “nonbank.”150  Nor 
                                                                                                     
146 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (20192018); 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018); see CFPB, Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts 
of Practices, CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS (Oct. 2012), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102012_cfpb_unfair-deceptive-abusive-acts-practices-
udaaps_procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/SUE5-A7TH]; Kennedy et. al., supra note 145, at 1146.  
147 See, e.g., Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy, & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and 
Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1467 
(2019). 
148 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million Widespread Illegal 




149 See, e.g., Complaint at 23, CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM (M.D. Pa. 2017) (“At 
the conclusion of those forbearances, Navient had added nearly four billion dollars of unpaid interest to 
the principal balance of their loans.”). 
150 See, e.g., Roosevelt Inst. Fin. & Wealth, Real Change: Turning Up the Heat on Non-Bank Lenders, 
ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (Sept. 4, 2009), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/real-change-turning-heat-non-bank-
lenders/ [https://perma.cc/9G4W-B9WF]. 
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are consumers’ lives organized by the type of product they are using.  Any 
meaningful effort to systemically reform the consumer finance marketplace must 
take seriously the need for regulators to have authority over the full range of products 
and companies that affect their citizens’ financial lives.  
The CFPB’s framers rejected the idea of determining the scope of the Bureau’s 
authority based on artificial lines.  In order to empower the CFPB to fulfill its mission 
of protecting consumers, financial services companies could no longer pick their 
regulator by structuring products or business units to fall outside of easily evaded 
definitions of product or narrow demarcations of covered entities.  Instead, the new 
agency had the ability to take action against the full range of players in the market 
with regard to any financial product or service offered to consumers.  As state 
lawmakers consider action to create a state consumer bureau, this insight is a 
necessary first step—lawmakers must vest in a single agency the authority to act in 
all corners of the consumer finance marketplace and address illegal practices with 
respect to all consumer financial products and services.   
Further, the lawmakers crafting state consumer bureaus have the opportunity to 
go beyond the CFPB’s specific structure, which does include several important 
limitations of the Bureau’s purview.  These blind spots should be a warning for state 
lawmakers–at key moments in the federal legislative process, political influence 
outweighed warnings of consumer harm and lawmakers excluded entire markets 
from the Bureau’s purview as a concession to special interests’ lobbying.151  
Lawmakers should not let lobbyists draw arbitrary lines exempting markets or 
market participants.  Additionally, lawmakers need not limit the scope of the 
agency’s oversight based out of political concern over a specific tier or size of 
financial institutions while ignoring the risks these entities may pose.  Lastly, while 
it is certain that preemption will preclude certain types of state action, lawmakers 
should not limit their state’s consumer bureau before it even opens its doors.  Instead 
states should empower the agencies to act as its leadership deems necessary, but also 
protect laws from legal challenge through carefully drafted severability or savings 
provisions.  Recognizing that political leadership will change over time, both in 
Washington and in state capitals, a state consumer bureau can best meet the needs of 
consumers if it can operate to the fullest extent permitted under federal law, without 
artificial limits.  Only by giving these new consumer watchdogs the broadest range 
of authorities to oversee all markets, for all institutions of all sizes, will state 
lawmakers ensure these agencies have the power to protect consumers across 
their entire financial lives.  
D. Consumer complaints are a critical component of consumer-driven 
                                                                                                     
151 12 U.S.C. § 5519 (2018); see, e.g., Press Release, United States Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & 
Urban Affairs, Dodd on Efforts to Carve Out Auto Dealer Financing (May 13, 2010), 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/dodd-on-efforts-to-carve-out-auto-dealer-financing 
[https://perma.cc/NPJ8-CHXH]; Ericka Eichelberger, Car Loans Could Be the Next Subprime Crisis. 
Thanks, Republicans!, MOTHER JONES (July 22, 2014), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/car-loans-subprime-crisis-republicans/ 
[https://perma.cc/39FU-P7SW]. 
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reform.  
To date, nearly two million consumers have been helped through the CFPB’s 
complaint portal.152 Importantly, the CFPB looked at those millions of complaints 
and recognized that complaints were not isolated incidents.153  It knew that for every 
consumer who complained about being ripped off, often many more sat silent despite 
being harmed and that, through careful attention to just one complaint, the CFPB 
could help millions.  
For six years, this approach to financial regulation was evident in every aspect 
of the Bureau’s work.  In effect, complaints were the foundation of the CFPB, driving 
real reform across markets. These complaints drove the prioritization of supervision 
and enforcement.154  They drove the research and analysis underpinning rulemaking, 
and they drove strategic inter- and intra-governmental efforts.  Through complaints, 
the CFPB was able to help tens of millions of people.155  
Building off of this insight, state lawmakers can do more than just replicate this 
approach—they can improve upon it.  Financial services firms, regardless of size or 
structure, should be required by state law to engage with the state consumer bureau 
in a robust complaint resolution process, where substantive answers to consumers’ 
questions are required and guidelines around “responses” and “resolution” are 
clearly articulated.  Furthermore, lawmakers should enshrine in statute a mandate for 
public access to complaints.156  In addition to publicizing complaint information to 
the public at large, this information—including company responses to borrowers’ 
                                                                                                     
 
152 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to Enhance Consumer Complaint Database, CFPB (Sept. 18, 
2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-enhance-consumer-complaint-
database/ [https://perma.cc/X4H3-5PAR ] (“To date, the Bureau has handled more than 1.9 million 
complaints. More than 5,000 financial companies have responded through this process, providing timely 
responses to 97 percent of the more than 1.3 million complaints sent to them for response.”). 
153 See, e.g., CFPB Report Finds Consumer Complaints Spurred Actions That Brought More Than $750 
Million in Relief for Student Loan Borrowers, CFPB (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-report-finds-consumer-complaints-spurred-
actions-brought-more-750-million-relief-student-loan-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/8JFR-PL45 ] 
(“‘Today’s report shows that complaints by student loan borrowers led to hundreds of millions of dollars 
in relief and important market reforms,’ said CFPB Director Richard Cordray.”). 
154 See, e.g., CFPB Examination Procedures, CFPB (Aug. 2017),  
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201708_cfpb_compliance-management-
review_supervision-and-examination-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2A3-8XQB]; 2017 Consumer 
Response Annual Report, CFPB (Mar. 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-
reports/2017-consumer-response-annual-report/ [https://perma.cc/UNX8-BM99]. 
155 CFPB Report Finds Consumer Complaints Spurred Actions That Brought More Than $750 Million in 
Relief for Student Loan Borrows, CFPB (Oct. 16, 2017) https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-report-finds-consumer-complaints-spurred-actions-brought-more-750-million-relief-
student-loan-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/WT6H-38KK ] (“The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) today released a report that shows complaints by student loan borrowers have driven actions 
that have produced more than $750 million in relief for student loan borrowers and strengthened the 
student loan repayment process for millions more.”). 
156 See, e.g., Sylvan Lane, Acting CFPB Chief Mulls Taking Down Public Complaint Database, THE 
HILL (Apr. 24, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/384697-acting-cfpb-chief-mulls-taking-down-
public-complaint-database [https://perma.cc/2LLX-QYWV]. 
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complaints—should also be shared as widely as possible across both federal and state 
law enforcement channels to ensure strategic coordination in tackling market 
breakdowns.157  
E. Finally, distinct populations can bring unique insight.   
Consumer-driven reform is not limited to complaints.  The architects of the 
CFPB realized that special populations interact with consumer financial markets in 
unique ways, and with that often comes unique problems.  From the Office for Young 
Consumers, to the Office for Servicemember Affairs, to the Office for Older 
Americans—dedicating resources to understanding the problems and experiences of 
these populations was a key to the CFPB’s success.158  Further, the challenges faced 
by these populations often forced these consumers to function as the “canary in the 
coalmine.”  When they faced breakdowns in their financial lives, it signaled a 
broader, emerging risk at a company, or across an entire industry.159 
State consumer bureaus should have the tools to follow this approach, housing 
dedicated offices for each segment of the population, and serving as an external 
outreach mechanism that creates an avenue for these populations to engage with the 
bureau.  These offices can also serve as drivers of policy change.  They can 
coordinate the work of offices across the state consumer bureau—aligning oversight, 
enforcement, research, rulemaking, and more to ensure that the experiences of these 
special populations are centered in all of the bureau’s work and to ensure that the 
entire agency remains focused on the needs of these constituencies.  
Just as was true with respect to specific laws under a state consumer bureau’s 
purview, state consumer bureaus would benefit from an even more expansive set of 
statutory authority to make sure that all uniquely vulnerable populations are 
represented in the bureau’s structure.  This could include, for example, an Office for 
New Americans, an Office for Rural Affairs, and an Office for Financial Inclusion. 
Furthermore, state consumer bureaus should be adaptable to address the needs of 
emerging populations not yet contemplated to guarantee that the agencies’ policy 
perspectives–and subsequent actions–remain responsive to the needs of vulnerable 
people across an entire state. 
CONCLUSION 
As discussed in detail above, the framework outlined in this Article illustrates 
the opportunity for lawmakers to empower their states to stand up for consumers by 
advancing systemic reforms and deploying a regulatory structure to replicate and 
amplify the successful work the CFPB accomplished in its half-decade of 
                                                                                                     
157 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(B) (2018) (“Routing calls to states. To the extent 
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subparagraph.”).  
158 See § 5493(g).  
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prominence.  In short, this framework not only provides the pathway to create a state 
consumer bureau that has the same tools, resources, and mission as its federal 
equivalent, but also positions this new agency closest to where people interact with 
the consumer financial products and services that shape their financial lives.  By 
following this approach, state lawmakers can ensure that a state consumer bureau 
can do what the federal government lacks the authority to do and can push other 
states, and the federal government, to do better.  A state consumer bureau can stand 
up when the federal government falls down. 
It is true that some have portrayed recent efforts to modernize and strengthen 
state oversight of financial services firms as merely a response to the direction of the 
federal government and a rejection of the current administration.  To some degree 
that is likely the case.  However, if lawmakers were to dismiss efforts to create state 
level consumer bureaus as simply a reaction to the current political climate, it would 
be incredibly shortsighted.  Improving state level consumer financial protection is 
about more than creating a backstop or alternative to federal oversight when 
Washington ideologies shift.  The framework outlined in this Article provides states 
with a roadmap to create a long-lasting legacy that can center consumers’ needs 
regardless of who sits in the White House.  
This effort is about creating a mechanism to push the status quo forward, even 
when state leaders are ideologically aligned with the federal government–one that 
recognizes that the collective fate of the millions of borrowers in a given state 
depends on well-functioning credit markets that are not tied solely to the outcome of 
a single federal election.  Such a mechanism is the only one capable of ensuring 
honest financial practices essential to the health of any state’s economy.  It is the 
only one that truly fulfills each state’s most solemn mission: to promote the well-
being of its people. 
 
  
